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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the strategic behavior between countries that have 
purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Tariffs and quotas are not 
equivalent protection instruments under non-cooperative behavior. Importers are better off" if 
they choose their trade instrument cooperatively. If production decisions occur before 
consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post 
elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. 
However, we show that the importers' inability to irrevocably conmiit to their trade 
instrument may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. 
We also derive the equilibrium production tax and quota if production decisions occur 
before consumption decisions and importers are not able to irrevocably conmiit to their ex-
ante trade policy. Production instrumeirts are not equivalent under non-cooperative behavior. 
Provided trade is restricted with an import quota, the equilibrium production policy is to 
restrict domestic production below the competitive level. If trade is restricted with an import 
tariff^ the equilibrium production policy may be to subsidize production. We derive 
conditions under which the ability of each importer to control domestic production increases 
welfare. 
In the next part of the dissertation, we endogenize the decision of two policy active 
importers to either commit to their import quota or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante 
quota once production decisions are made. Production in both importing countries is subject 
to an asymmetric random shock. Both policy active importers prefer not to commit to their 
trade policy given a sufficiently high degree of variance in production uncertainty. Under 
vii 
certain conditions, there exists an equilibriiun where one country commits to its ex-ante 
quota while the other keeps the flexibility to revise the level of its quota after uncertainty is 
resolved. 
Finally, we examine the endogenous choice of trade instnjment among two policy 
active importers. Production and consumption decisions are carried out simultaneously and 
the producers' cost function is subject to an asymmetric random shock. In the case where 
random disturbances are zero, the equilibrium of the game entails both importers choosing to 
use an import quota. Under production risk, there exists an equilibrium where one country 
uses an import quota while the other uses a tariff. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
I.l - Introduction 
In today's economic world, most countries face considerable pressure from trading 
partners to eliminate trade barriers. Some nations successfully resist adhering to the concept 
of free trade. Their actions can be motivated by political pressure coming from domestic 
agents or by the attainment of some non-economic objectives. However, countries may also 
be preoccupied by the exercise of their market power. In agricultural markets, the existence 
of state trading enterprises (STEs) may be an indication that some countries actually think 
they possess market power for a certain good. 
The exercise of that market power differs greatly across countries and commodities. 
In this thesis, we look at importers who can influence the world price at which they buy a 
certain good due to their economic size. This is referred to as the large country assumption 
in the economic literature. We assume that countries behave non-cooperatively when 
deciding how to use their respective market power. This setting has been neglected in the 
literature as researchers' efforts have mainly concentrated on the behavior of a single policy 
active importer. 
Pursuing an active corrmiercial policy has potentially dynamic implications, which 
have often been ignored in research. The timing at which commercial policy is used if 
production decisions and consumption decisions are separated in time can influence greatly 
the impacts of commercial policies. Agricultural markets provide a good example of this 
situation, since there exists a lag between planting decision and harvest and consumption 
decisions. Similarly, there may exist a lag between investment decisions of firms and labor 
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hiring decisions because capital takes time to accumulate. Policy active countries may have 
the incentive to change their policies between the two stages. This has potentially enormous 
impacts on the ranking of trade policies and important welfare considerations. The purpose 
of this thesis is to study the impact of production lags on policy active importers' welfare 
under various assumptions. 
- Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 investigates the strategic behavior between coimtries that have purchasing 
power on the world market for a certain good. It stresses the potential welfare superiority of 
the 'no-commitment' equilibrium compared to the preconmiitment solution from the 
importers' perspective. The next chapter explores the policy active importers' incentives and 
the welfare implications of using both production policies and trade polices if importers are 
not able to irrevocably commit themselves to their ex-ante trade policy. We derive 
conditions under which the ability of each importer to control domestic production increases 
welfare. The ensuing chapter allows two policy active importers to endogenously decide 
whether to commit or not conmiit to their trade policy before production decisions are made 
if each importer's domestic production is subject to a country-specific random shock. The 
introduction of risk in production provides an option value for importers not to commit to 
their trade policy. The next chapter endogenizes the type of trade instrument used by 
importers. Non-cooperative behavior in our model implies a non-equivalence of trade 
instruments. We emphasize the factors leading importers to prefer a certain type of 
instrument to another. The last chapter jQnally provides general conclusions and discusses 
future areas of research. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRADE POLICY AND TIME CONSISTENCY 
IN AN OLIGOPSONISTIC WORLD MARKET 
2.1 - Introduction 
Much has been written on the theory of optimal tariffs (see Corden (1994) for a 
detailed survey). However, as pointed out by Grant and Quiggin (1997), strategic issues 
raised by a market structure where there is more than one country with market power for a 
good have not been addressed formally. This issue of market structure in trade policy is 
somewhat related to the study of oligopoly theory. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, it investigates the 
strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing power on the world market. This 
strategic game between policy active importers has been introduced first by Bergstrom 
(1982) and later by Karp and Newbery (1991,1992).' We formalize the non-equivalence of 
tariffs and quotas given the structure of the world market and the non-cooperative behavior 
among importers. Importers set their trade instrument given their belief about the type of 
instrument the other importers will use. When the stratesr space is restricted to the use of a 
tariff the Nash equilibrium entails lower tariffs for each country than in the situation when 
they collude and act as a single monopoly importer. If the strategy space is restricted to 
quotas, the non-cooperative solution also implies that a too large quantity is imported in each 
country. Each country would be better off by colluding and importing a smaller quantity. 
' These papers analyze the strategic behavior between importers of a depletable resource. There is a significant 
difference between the optimal tariff for an ordinary good compared to an exhaustible resource such as oiL Oil 
is available in a fixed amount and, if costless to extract, its suiq)ly will be inelastic. However, in a trade context, 
exports are not inelastic, i.e. there is a role for demand. 
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The main contribution of this chapter analyses time consistency issues. As pointed 
out by Staiger (1995), time consistency problems and rules versus discretion issues have 
occupied a major place in the macroeconomics and public finance literature, but less so in the 
international trade field. With a sufficient degree of discretion, an optimal trade policy is 
bound to lack credibility because it is almost surely time inconsistent. Most of the time 
consistency issues addressed in the economic literature emphasize the inferiority of the no 
commitment solution. 
We assume there is a lag between production and consumption, and that all countries 
can change their policy between the two stages. For example, this setting applies to 
agricultural markets with spring planting and fall harvest.^  In the case of tariffs, the ex-post 
(given production decisions) tariff will be higher than the ex-ante (before production 
decisions are made) tariff because the residual export supply curve elasticity faced by each 
country is lower ex-post. With perfect foresight, foreign producers flilly anticipate the time 
consistent tariff and decrease their production accordingly. Therefore, the lower ex-post 
elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve may be welfare increasing for the policy 
active importers compared to the ex-cmte situation because of its off-setting welfare effect 
with respect to the trade instrument competition. The same argument also applies to the 
strategic quota game. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, it provides a review of the literature on 
time consistency of trade policy. The theoretical model is set out in the second section to 
 ^ For example, the same issue would arise if there was a lag between capital/investment decisions and labor 
decisions. 
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address optimal trade policy and time consistency issues. Next, we develop a numerical 
example to illustrate the various results. The last section provides concluding remarks. 
2.2 - Review of Literature 
According to the well-known theory of Johnson (1954), the optimal tariff for a large 
country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. Lapan (1988) points 
out that, in the case where production decisions are made before consumption and trade 
decisions, and that the government can readjust its tariff between the two stages, the standard 
optimal tariff will not be time consistent. From an ex-post perspective, i.e. once production 
decisions are made, the foreign export supply elasticity is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. 
Therefore, policy makers have an incentive to set ex-post tariffs at a higher level than they 
would if they could precommit to the ex-ante tariff. 
The foreign and domestic producers, knowing that the ex-ante tariff is not time 
consistent will adjust their production accordingly (i.e. foreign production will be lower than 
if the large country could precommit to the ex-ante optimal tariff) and both countries will be 
worse off The importance of the timing assumption is immediate once it is recalled that a 
tariff can always be decomposed into a production subsidy and a consumption tax on the 
importable good. 
Maskin and Newbery (1990) model the behavior of a large importer of oil unable to 
commit to future tariffs. Time consistency models of exhaustible resources point out that 
scarcity can be artificially induced by the exercise of market power. Suppliers not only have 
to make their extraction (and hence their production) decision according to current prices, but 
also by comparing anticipated future prices, which will depend on future levels of a tariff In 
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their two period model, if the importer places sufficient weight on second period 
consumption of oil, and can revise costlessly the tariff set in the first period, the welfare level 
in the time consistent tariff equilibrium may be less than the firee-trade welfare level. 
BCarp and Newbery (1991,1992) build a continuous time model where oligopsonistic 
importers choose a time path of tariffs to maximize their domestic welfare. They show that 
the open loop strategy is not time consistent. They rely on numerical methods to illustrate 
the welfare inferiority of the closed-loop solution compared to the open-loop solution.^ 
However, they simplify the model so that there is only one large impc'tter. In that case, there 
is disadvantageous market power for the importer. In their 1991 paper, they illustrate the 
differences betv/een the time consistent tariff and the importers' ^'/elfare under different 
sequential games between policy active importers and competitive exporters. 
Karp and Perloff (1995) consider the impacts of government commitment on output 
and investment subsidies in a strategic trade model a la Brander-Spencer. Output policies 
based on static models are not altered for a dynamic model. However, investment decisions 
depend on fiiture as well as current government policies. If preconunitment is not feasible, 
investment policy is of a limited strategic use."* Table 2.1 summarizes the principal papers on 
time consistency of trade polices. 
 ^ A closed-loop solution refers to an equilibrium where players can observe and respond to their opponents' 
actions at the end of each period. The open-loop solution is a fimction of Hme alone. 
* Other interesting issues of time consistent in international trade have been addressed in the literature. Staiger 
and Tabelliimi (1987, 1989) considered the credibility issue arising fiom the use of tariff as a redistributive 
tool. Totnell (1991), Brainard (1994) and Wri^  (199S) explain that future tariff removal is time inconsistent if 
protection was either granted to provide incentives to firms to reduce their costs or to a declining industry. Karp 
and Paul (1998) analyze the impact of tariff commitment on the abiUty to affect the reallocation of labor in a 
dying industry. All dT these papers address redistributive or second-best issues. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of the literature review on time consistency of trade policies 
Domestic market Worid market 
Paper structure structure Instruments Conclusions 
Lapan 
(1988) 
Competitive Monopolistic Equivalence 
of tariffs and 
quotas 
Domestic country and 
foreigners lose from 
the inability to commit 
by the large country. 
Maskin and 
Newbery 
(1990) 
Competitive Monopolistic Equivalence 
of tariffs and 
quotas 
No conrniitment 
implies a welfare loss 
for the large importer. 
Karp and 
Newbery 
(1991) 
Competitive Oligopolistic Tariffs No commitment 
implies lower welfare 
for single large 
importer. 
Karp and 
Newbery 
(1992) 
Competitive Oligopolistic Tariffs Welfare comparisons 
of sequential games 
between importers and 
exporters. 
Karp and 
Perloff 
(1995) 
Monopolistic Competitive Output and 
investment 
subsidies 
Lack of commitment 
makes investment 
policy unattractive but 
has no effect on output 
policy. 
2.3 — Precommitment and Optimal Trade Policies 
Consider a partial equilibrium model. Suppose there are N importing nations with 
purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Their inverse domestic demand is 
denoted by where and /?, are the domestic demand and domestic price respectively. 
Denote the world price and foreign exports from the rest of the world by p and X 
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respectively. The aggregate foreign export supply is defined by: X{p*,p) = Q(J^)-D{p) 
where Q(jp*) and D(p) are the foreign supply and demand respectively. The superscript e  
is used to denote producers' price expectations when production decisions are made. This 
notation is introduced to model the time consistency issue later in the chapter. Foreign 
supply depends on the producers' price expectations and hence on their expectation of the 
trade policies, whereas foreign demand depends on the realized world price. This structure 
g ives  r i s e  t o  a  fo re ign  expo r t  supp ly  cu rve :  X{p ,p*) .  
In this section we assume decisions are made in the following sequence: 
1. Importing nations irrevocably commit to their trade policy (tariffs or quotas). 
2. Production decisions are made. 
3. Consumption and trade decisions are carried out. 
Under the above sequence of actions, p*  =p ,  and thus the foreign export supply curve is: 
^(p) = X[p*,p)\^ =Q(p) - . Denote by ( f ) '  the slope of the ex-ante foreign export 
' p ' = p  
supply curve so that = 0 ' -D ' .  
2.3.1 Tariff competition 
If Ti is the ad-valorem tariff imposed by country i on imports, we have the following 
arbitrage condition between the domestic and world price: = p{l + T.). If qt is the 
quantity produced in country /, imports are defined by ,p,)=d^(j).)- q^ip*), where 
again the superscript e denotes producers' expectation. From an ex-ante perspective, 
p' = /?,, and the slope of the import demand is: = d^-ql. World market equilibrium 
implies <p{p) = For further reference, totally differentiate this equilibrium 
condition to obtain; 
-1-= <0 (2.1) 
Sufficient conditions for (2.1) to be negative are that the foreign export supply be 
positively sloped and that the import demand be negatively sloped. The welfare of foreign 
exporters is increasing with the world price and thus decreasing in every tariff. The objective 
function of the government in country / is to maximize domestic welfare defined as the sum 
of consumer surplus^, producer surplus and tariff revenue. Domestic welfare of country / is: 
''i <tt 
K = \Pi(yr W, - P,^i + Pi<li - J^'(2;)dz, + T,pm, (2.2) 
0 0 
such that di=qi~  ni i ,  and+^.) = p(} + ^ i)- Rewrite (2.2) as: 
^ = ^P.iy.)<fy, -c(q.)-pm, (2.3) 
To solve for the optimal ex-ante tariff, totally differentiate equation (2.3): 
^ = [P,« ) - c'iq, )]^, + [Pi (d,) - p\im^ - m.c^ (2.4) 
The expression in the first bracket on the right hand-side of (2.4) is equal to zero absent 
government domestic policy since we assume perfect competition in production. The world 
price is determined according to the ex-cmte residual foreign export supply: 
=0 (2.5) 
^Consumer surplus is an exact measure of consumer wel&re if rfftmiwirf is derived fiom a quasi-linear utility 
function. 
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Differentiating the behavioral equation in (2.5), given the other countries' tariff 
choice, yields; 
(2.6) 
The optimal tariff is found by setting (2.4) to zero and substituting (2.6) in (2.4) for dm,. 
Finally, divide both sides of (2.4) by dr, to get; 
dW. 
dr. 
-^ = 0 
dr. 
(2.7) 
Assuming that the welfare function in (2.3) is strictly concave in its own tariff 
everywhere, the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied. Equation (2.7) implicitly 
yields the reaction flinction of country / as a fiinction of its belief about other countries' 
tariff rf = ,1-^). The Nash equilibrium is the set of tariffs 
(rf,...,rf,...,r;^) such that rf =/2(rf,...,r^) and =i?(rf,...,r^), V i j .  After some 
manipulations, the ex-ante (or precommitment) tariff in elasticity form is; 
r' = a. (2.8) 
where s ^ 'pl<t) is the foreign export supply elasticity with precommitment, Oi is country 
/•'s share of world imports, and 77^ = -m'jPjjmj is the import demand elasticity of country j. 
Therefore, the denominator in (2.8) represents the elasticity of the residual foreign export 
supply curve. If all countries are symmetric, their share of world imports is equal to UN. As 
N—>oo, the optimal policy becomes free trade. 
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Consider the case where the N countries maximize their joint welfare. Intuitively, 
countries will internalize the adverse effect on world price given by the change of other 
countries' imports with respect to tl ieir own tariff. The joint welfare of all importers is: 
V A' N 
y=l 0 7=1 .=I 
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to p ,qt and nii yields after some manipulations: 
^ = [P, (d,) - c'iq. + {p. (d.) - p)cim, - (2.10) 
Since the expression {Pi{d^)-c'{q^)^ equals zero, (2.10) can be rewritten as: 
dW = x^pdm^ — (2-11) 
Differentiating the behavioral equation (2.5) yields (p'(^ = dm^^. Use this to 
substitute in (2.11) for dm,, set (2.11) to zero to find a maximum, and divide both sides by dz, 
to yield; 
= = C2.12) 
Solving (2.12) jdelds j, the optimal collusive tariff for importer /. It is 
proportional to the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity, which is the standard result 
in the optimal tariff literature. Evaluate (2.12) at z; = z/" to obtain; 
dW 
dr. 
r,=rf 
 ^ Obviously, the choice of instrument does not matter for the collusive and full information case. It can be 
readily shown that quotas and tariff are equivalent instruments under collusion. Therefore, differentiating 
equation (2.5), we treat imports nijj * /, as given. 
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Equation (2.13) provides the following ranking between the precommitment tariff and 
collusive tariff: rl" < r,*. Countries would be better off acting cooperatively; thus maximizing 
their joint welfare. In the non-cooperative setting, when a country decreases its tariff, it fails 
to consider the reduction in other countries' welfare that is caused by the ensuing increase in 
the world price. 
2.3.2 Quota competition 
We will now restrict the strategy space of the N importers to a quota. We set = 0 V 
j and use imports as the choice variable. The domestic price is determined by: 
- ^ iiPi) ~ ^iijPi) • In the ex-ante situation, when production decisions are carried out 
simultaneously with consumption, pi =Pi- The domestic price is then . If the choice 
variable is imports, the ex-ante residual foreign export supply faced by country i is defined 
Auctioning the quota licenses raises government revenue (/?, - p)m^. Therefore, 
country fs welfare is still defined by (2.3). Differentiating the residual export supply curve 
in (2.14) given the other countries' quota gives: 
by: 
(2.14) 
tp'c^-dm, = 0 (2.15) 
Using (2.15) to substitute for in (2.4), we get: 
(2.16) 
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We assume the welfare function to be concave everywhere in its own imports. 
Equation (2.16) yields the reaction fiinction of country i. The intersection of every countries' 
reaction fixnction gives the Nash equilibrium precommitment quota m/. Define df as the 
tariff equivalent measure of the difference between the domestic price and the world price 
given mf. From (2.16), the preconmiitment tariff equivalent in elasticity form is: 
= = = (2.17) 
p pf 4' 
As we mentioned before, in the case of collusion, the optimal policy is independent of 
the instrument used. The optimal collusive quota is m,' and the collusion tariff equivalent of 
the import quota in elasticity form is: 9' = r* = l/^' . It can readily be shown that the 
collusion quota is lower than the ex-cmte Nash equilibrium quota. Under the strategic quota 
game, when a country increases its quantity imported, it fails to consider the reduction in 
other countries' welfare that is caused by the ensuing increase in the world price. 
Proposition 2.1: Assume N symmetric policy active importers. The ex-ante Nash 
equilibrium import quota induces a higher price differential between the domestic price and 
the world price than the optimal ex-ante tariff. Moreover, the importer's welfare associated 
with the ex-ante quota will be higher than the welfare associated with the precommitment 
tariff. 
Proof. Evaluating (2.7) at r, = Of yields: 
dW 
dr. 
= -m 
T,=ef 
< 0  (2.18) 
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From (2.1) and because the import demand is negatively sloped, the expression in 
(2.18) provides the following ranking; given symmetry among policy active 
importers. Because tariffs and quotas are equivalent under collusive behavior, we have the 
following rankings; rf < df <t] . Domestic welfare of each importer under both Nash 
equilibria is lower than in the collusive equilibrium. Since the ex-ante quota is closer to the 
collusive solution than the ex-ante tariff, it must bring a higher welfare level in equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind proposition 2.1 is simple because it is tantamount to the standard 
oligopoly theory. By using a tariff as their trade instrument, each country faces a more 
elastic residual foreign export supply at the tariff set by the other coimtries than in the 
monopsony case. Moreover, the residual foreign export supply curve will be even more 
elastic than under the strategic quota game. When countries use a quota, the Nash 
equilibrium will induce a higher welfare than tariffs because countries increasing their 
imports by one (differential) unit cause an increase in the world price of p'{X). Tariffs do 
not have an equivalent effect on the world price, since imports of other countries also vary 
following a change in one importer's tariff. 
The results in proposition 2.1 contrast with the bilateral monopoly case (two-good, 
two-country retaliation world). The use of a quota in our model does not eliminate trade as 
in the Rodriguez's model (1974). In the quota-retaliation framework, each country carmot 
enforce a favorable terms of trade shift. Although both wish to achieve the same level of 
trade restriction on a certain good, they have different preferred levels of trade in the other 
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good. In our model the foreign exporters are passive. Therefore, competing importers are 
able to induce a terms of trade shift, albeit not optimal, because they fail to take into account 
(or do not care about) the consequence of their trade policy on the other policy active 
importers' welfare. The same basic story applies to the bilateral monopoly with tariffs as 
strategic variables. In that situation, it is possible to find an equilibrium where both countries 
are worse off than under free trade. This is ruled out in our setting since every country gains 
by imposing a tariff and importer i gains when importer j imposes a tariff. 
2.4 - Time Consistency and Optimal Trade Policies 
This section derives the time consistent trade instrument when there is a lag between 
production and consumption decisions. The timing of events is of great importance. We 
follow the hypothesis made in Lapan (1988). First, each country armounces its tariff given 
its own belief about the tariff choice of other countries. Then, production decisions are made 
according to price expectations of domestic and foreign producers. Before consumption 
decisions (and trade decisions) are made, each government can costlessly revise the level of 
its trade instrument set at the begirming of the game. Finally, consumption decisions are 
made and trade between countries is carried out. 
Because there is a lag between production and consumption, and all countries can 
change their tariff after production decisions are made, the time consistent tariff is higher 
than the precommitment tariff. This is because the ex-post residual foreign export supply 
elasticity faced by country / is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. The lack of commitment by 
importers may be collectively beneficial since the ex-post tariff is bounded below by the ex-
ante tariff. With the perfect foresight assumption, foreign producers fiilly anticipate the tariff 
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change after production decisions are made. Since the anticipated time consistent tariff is 
larger, the lower world price causes a contraction in production. Therefore, the lack of 
commitment can increase domestic welfare by offsetting the policy competition welfare 
effect. However, if foreign supply is very elastic, thus making the residual ex-post export 
supply elasticity lower than the ex-ante elasticity, the potential gain of not committing to the 
ex-ante tariff can vanish. 
3.4.1 Tariff competition 
Formally, the slope of the ex-post foreign export supply curve is: 
Xr^=<t>'-O' - -D'. Clearly, given output levels, the slope of the foreign export supply is 
smaller ex-post than ex-ante if 0'>0. Restricting the strategy space to the use of a tariff 
the following arbitrage condition between the world price and domestic price must hold if 
imports in country i are positive: p^ = ^(l + r,). From an ex-post perspective, i.e. when 
production decisions are made: ^mJ^p^ =m[->rq[. The welfare function of the government, 
once production decisions are made is still defined as in (2.3). The ex-post residual foreign 
export supply is: 
Totally differentiate (2.19) given the tariff choice of other countries and 
predetermined output levels. Assume perfect foresight so that producers correctly anticipate 
the tariffs set by govenmients ex-post, and thus ti = t', p^p* and p^ - p*. 
(2.19) 
j*i OPj ^ 
(2.20) 
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Set equation (2.4) to zero, substitute (2.20) in (2.4) for dm, and divide both sides by 
dr,. After some manipulations, you get the ex-post tariff reaction function implicitly defined 
by; 
dW, _ 
dr. ^,P P  i )  
-m. = 0 (2.21) 
The tariff reaction fimction for country / is; rf = r,_,, ). Define the 
ex-post elasticities; I^ p)- Iwhere J i  = -D '/(O' -D') e[0,l] and 
^]=(Pj{'^j/4>j)/f"j) = -Mj(Pjmj/m^) where h (-i/;/(g';-i/;)) e[0,l]. Imposing a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, the time consistent tariff in elasticity form is; 
T. = a. 
y" 
Proposition 2.2; Assuming symmetry among the policy active importers, the time consistent 
tariff is higher than the ex-ante tariff. Moreover, the inability to precommit to the ex-ante 
tariff may result in a higher welfare ex-post for all importing countries. 
Proof. Evaluating (2.21) at the precommitment solution xf, we get; 
dW 
dr. 
=  T^p  
r,=if dr, 
> 0  (2.22) 
Assuming {dfVJdr^) is decreasing in the (symmetric) tariff vector, (2.22) implies that the 
ex-/705r tariff will be higher than the ex-ante tariff, rf < rt. From (2.13), we have; rf < r*. 
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Domestic welfare must be lower under both the ex-cmte and ex-post equilibrium tariffs than 
under the collusive tariff since the ex-ante collusive tariff yields the global optimum. Since 
the domestic welfare function is continuous and monotonic over the interval [rf, r,'], a 
sufficient condition for the time consistent tariff to be welfare superior to the ex-ante tariff is 
to fall within the previous interval. However, a Nash equilibrium resulting in an ex-post 
tariff higher than the collusive ex-ante tariff has an indeterminate effect on domestic welfare 
compared to the precommitment tariff QED. 
To compare the time consistent tariff to the optimal collusive tariff, evaluate (2.21) at 
r . :  
dv. 
= + (2.23) 
From (2.23), with symmetric importers, we have that rf < t\ if 
f j m ' .  T h i s  c a n  n o t  o c c u r  f o r  1 .  F o r  A ' "  >  1 ,  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
that rf < x\ increases as; (i) ^ increases; (ii) a decreases; and (iii) the price responsiveness 
of the import demand in importing nations increases compared to the price responsiveness of 
the foreign export supply. 
The intuition behind proposition 2.2 is the following. The ex-ante Nash equilibrium 
entails tariffs set too low compared to the collusive equilibrium because countries perceive a 
more elastic residual foreign export supply than they would if they acted cooperatively. The 
lower ex-post foreign supply elasticity partly offsets that feet. When the supply in exporting 
nations is not very elastic (J1 large), the failure to precommit is not very costly, and hence 
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the welfare of importing nations will be improved by this failure to precommit. Similarly, 
when the number of nations is large (low or), or demand is very elastic in importing nations, 
the tariff competition among these nations is severe and hence the increase in tariff due to the 
inability to preconmiit is welfare improving. However, if foreign production is very elastic 
(low 77), then welfare can be lower ex-post since the equilibrium ex-post will be far apart 
from the ex-ante equilibrium. 
2.4.2 Quota competition 
The time consistent quota is derived in a similar way to the time consistent tariff 
Imposing a quota on imports is equivalent to setting the domestic price. In this case, since 
r, the domestic price is p^{m^,p*). The residual foreign export supply 
curve &ced by country / is X{p,p')-^mj -m. = 0. Differentiate the latter expression to 
get; X^(^,p')-dm^ =0. Perfect foresight implies pt = Pi and p* =p . Setting equation 
(2.4) to zero after appropriate substitutions implicitly yields the ex-post quota reaction 
function /wf = ). Imposing a subgame perfect equilibrium, the 
time consistent tariff equivalent quota in elasticity form can be written as: 
^ = = = (2.24) 
dm  ^ p  ^
Proposition 2.3: Assuming symmetry among the policy active importers, the time consistent 
quota is lower than the precommitment quota. It induces a higher price differential between 
the domestic price and the world price ex-post than in the ex-ante case. Moreover, the 
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inability to precommit to the ex-ante quota may be collectively welfare improving for all 
importing countries. 
Proof: Evaluating (2.24) at the preconmiitment solution mf, we get 
dW 
= (2.25) 
. D' 
»%=< ^ — dm^ 
Equation (2.25) gives the following ranking between the ex~ante Nash equilibrium quota and 
the time consistent ex-post quota, < mf. Similar to the case of tariffs, the incapability to 
precommit to a quota can be welfare improving since we have proved the folloAving rankings; 
mf > m' and mf >m' -, and that the ex-ante collusive quota yields the global optimum. The 
world market structure in our model implies that the quantity imported in each country is too 
large ex-ante. Since ex-post, the residual foreign export supply is less elastic, each country 
will import a smaller quantity. QED. 
To compare the time consistent quota to the optimal collusive quota, evaluate (2.24) 
at e' : 
e'p _ 
= -^(//-a,) (2.26) 
cht^ 
The inability to commit to the ex-ante import quota is collectively beneficial if ^ > 1 / 2 since 
(2.25) and (2.26) yield: mf >mf > m' 
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Proposition 2.4: Assuming symmetric policy active importers who cannot preconmiit to a 
trade policy: (/) the time consistent tariff leads to lower equilibrium tariff than the time 
consistent equilibrium quotas (if) the time consistent quota equilibrium yields higher 
welfare than the tariff equilibrium if NJi > I; Qii) the time consistent tariff equilibrium yields 
higher welfare than the quota equilibrium if NJi+Nfi(N -  I)(OT'/^')(I + r') < 1; and (/v) the 
ranking between the two instruments 
NJi + Nfi(N — X){m'I<p'){\ + r*) > 1 > NJi. 
IS indeterminate if 
Proof: Evaluating (2.21) at 01 C .  dW, 
dr. \j" 
< 0 implies rf < ^. 5r, H , , 
From proposition 2.3, if Ji>a, then O' <t ' and combining with the previous statement 
yields r' <0^ < t' ; this proves the second claim. In case where 
iV72+iy^(iV-l)(/n7^')(l + r*) < 1, then we have rf > t' from (2.23); combining with the 
first statement yields ^ > rf > r*, proving the third claim. Finally, under (iv) we have: 
0^ >t' > rf and the two equilibria can not be ranked. QED. 
2.5 - A Numerical Example 
This section tries to illustrate the welfare implications of the precommitment and time 
consistent trade instrument discussed in propositions 2.1 to 2.4. Suppose domestic 
2 
preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility function: U{w^,x^) = w, +—x^— 
b 2b 
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where w, is a numeraire good. These preferences implies the domestic demand (d,) for good 
Xi is; 4 =a-bp^, where a and b are positive constants andpi is the domestic price. Domestic 
producers of the importable good in coimtry i have the following cost fimction; 
q" q 
c(q,) = ——1-—Competitive domestic markets imply the domestic supply function is: 
g 
q^ =-c->t-gp,, where is a positive constant. Assume for simplicity the available policy is a 
specific tariff', so that /?, = ^+', • The import demand function of country / is then; 
m, =a + c-(jb+g){p + t,).  
The welfare function for country i is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus 
and tariff revenue: 
such that d.=q^+m^. The export supply curve of the rest of the world is; 
X(p,p*) = Q(p')-D(p) = {5-a)+^p + xp' At the ex-ante level p' = p, so the ex-ante 
foreign export supply curve is; ^(^) = + . World equilibrium implies 
_ _ _ nia*c)-is-a)-(p+gxy.'i) 
Solving for p yields: p- Og+y) + Af(i+g) ^ The first 
order condition of the strategic tariff game can be rewritten as t^{dmjdt^) = m.{(^l&^). 
Therefore, the reaction fimction for country i is implicitly defined by: 
^In our model, propositioii 2.1 to 2.4 still hold if the strategy space is restricted to specific taiifi^  instead of ad-
valorem tariff. However, specific tariff and ad-valorem tar  ^are not equivalent iostmments. The use of a 
specific tariff is uniquely to facilitate the computation of the numerical example in this sectioa 
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(a+c) .  
-t, =7 7+(^+^) [(^+r)+iV(4+^)] 
n(a+c)-(s-a)-(h+g)y,^ (2.28) 
Imposing symmetry among the importing countries, the intersection of the reaction 
flmctions solves for the ex-ante Nash equilibrium. To simplify the derivation of further 
results, rescale the following parameters; a' = a in ,s' = 51n ,fi' = in and y' -y in. 
Moreover, define = (y^' + •*"5^) ~ ~ (^' ~ ^')]/ 
precommitment optimal tariff is: 
t' = (2.29) 
' a(2 + a) + (jv-l)(l + a)-
The optimal collusive tariff is given by maximizing the sum of the JV countries' 
welfare. This gives a set of iV first order conditions of the type: dmjdt^ = X{dpldt^). 
Because of the symmetry between the countries, U = tj. The solution is: 
t, = (2.30) 
' yl(2 + /l) ^ 
We have expressed the precommitment tariff as a deviation fi-om the collusive tariff 
Both tariffs have the same numerator and only differ in their denominator. It is readily seen 
that if iV > 1, tf <t\, because (JV-l)(l+yl)^ >0. The latter expression illustrates the 
theoretical result of equation (2.13). The collusive tariff is higher than the non-cooperative 
precommitment tariff provided A^> 1. 
The time consistent tariff is found by maximizing: 
W.^ 'l -c(q-)-pm, = U, (2.31) 
I O b lb 2g g 
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where q' represents domestic production given the trade policy expectation of producers in 
country /. From the government's perspective, production is fixed. In this case, 
Na + a-Q' 
p= — and m, =a-bt.-q'-bp. The first order condition is; 
 ^ Nb-rfi ' ' 'i' y 
1^1) = '"i (^/^i) • Imposing perfect foresight implies , and q' =c+gp^. The 
implicit reaction function of country i  is: ((- \)b+0) = m^. 
For further reference, define the following two parameters fi^bfip-^g) e[0,l] and 
7^ = s[0,l]. The parameters fi and can be interpreted as the relative domestic 
and foreign demand responsiveness respectively. Using the symmetry across countries, the 
optimal time consistent tariff is: 
a 
t' (2 32) 
Using equations (2.29), (2.30) and (2.32), we can illustrate the point made in 
proposition 2. Because we used linear domestic and foreign demand schedules and quadratic 
cost fiinctions, it should be clear that welfare of country / is a quadratic function. The 
welfare function reaches a maximum at t' and is synometric around that point. With those 
properties, we show that the inability to precommit to the ex-ante tariff increases welfare for 
an importer if the following inequality holds: <t' <t' +(/*-//). The first inequality is 
ensured by proposition 2. The second inequality holds if: 
A' = [A(2+A) + 2(^• -1)(1 + \XiNJi -1) + (iV -1)/^]+(AT - l);i(2+A)(l + 2) > 0 
The inability to conmiit to the specific tariff is collectively beneficial for the policy 
active importers if the inequality above is satisfied. Clearly, if ^ = 1, A' <0 implying 
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precommitment is desirable. For^> 1, a sufficient condition for A' to be greater than zero 
is for ^>1! N because then <t" <t'.  The only remaining question is what if > t ' .  
Since A' is increasing in N, the likelihood that the inability to precommit is beneficial 
increases with AT Fixing N = 2 and A = 1, A' becomes: 22^+1 Ifi-5 > 0. Thus, for not 
very high relative foreign and domestic demand responsiveness, the collective inability to 
commit to the ex-ante specific tariff increases welfare for policy active importers. 
In the case of a strategic quota game, m, is the choice variable. Since in 
the precommitment case, domestic market equilibrium implies; p, = {a-tc-m.)/{b + g). 
Solving for the inverse ex-ante foreign export supply gives: p(X) 
Maximizing domestic welfare in (2.27), the first order condition is; p, -^= p'm ,^ where p' 
is the derivative of the inverse foreign export supply with respect to imports in country /. 
If the policy active importers can precommit to their policy, the quota reaction 
~  * _ -  i .  - i -  i j n j u  a - c - m .  ^  function of country i is then implicitly defined by: — = — . 
b+g p+Y fi+Y 
Imposing symmetry between the countries allows one to solve for the optimal Nash 
. - (fl+c)(J3->ry) — (cc-sr\(b+g) _ 
equilibnum quota: m' = —. The tariff equivalent is given by: {n + \)(b + g)-^(^-\-r) 
Of = Pi-p • With various simple manipulations, one finds: 
Of = C> 33) 
M2+A) + (N-l)A(l + A) '  
Note that equations (2.29) and (2.33) give the same optimal tariff when N=\. This 
shows the equivalency result between quotas and tariffs in case of a single large country. 
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However, following proposition 1, if iV > 1, t^ ' < Of since (iV-l)((l + A)"->?.(l+yl)) = 
{N -1)(1 + >1) > 0; and quotas are welfare superior to tariffs. In the collusive case, the choice 
of tariff or quota is irrelevant and thus, the tariff equivalent 0' is equal to t* in equation 
(2.30). 
Finally, the time consistent quota is derived by assuming production is fixed. The 
price in importing countries is: Pi ={a-m^—q'^lb. Similarly, the foreign inverse export 
supply curve is; piX,0*) = {a + X-O'^jand the world price is determined such that 
X = • The first order condition implicitly defines the quota reaction function of 
country /: j3{a-m^-q*)-b(a + X-0) = bm^. Imposing perfect foresight and symmetry 
among the N countnes gives: m. = — — . The time 
consistent tariff equivalent is: 
^ = (2.34) 
A(2 + /l) + (7i/V-IXl+A)A ^ ^ 
Again, because we have expressed equations (2.33) and (2.34) in terms of deviation 
fi'om the optimal collusive tariff equivalent, we can easily illustrate proposition 2.3. The 
importers' collective inability to precommit to their trade policy will be welfare improving if 
the following inequality holds; df <&[ <&] . The first inequality in the latter 
expression always holds for ^ < 1. The second inequality holds if: 
A" = [2iV(l + x\{n7i -1) + (2 + x^n -1) > 0 (2.35) 
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If you set N= I, then A® < 0, and the inability to precommit to the ex-ante quota hurts 
the large country [Lapan (1988)]. For N^\, note that (2.35) is independent of the 
parameter //. This means that domestic demand and supply do not play a role in the ex-post 
versus ex-ante welfare analysis in the strategic quota game. Further note that is an 
increasing function of fi. The inability to precommit to the ex-ante quota is more likely to 
be welfare improving the higher the foreign exporters relative demand responsiveness is. A 
sufficient condition for the inequality to hold is that: ^ > 1 / iV, since it implies: 6^^ <d\. The 
sign of dA^/dN is ambiguous. The likelihood that the inability to precommit is beneficial 
increases withis increasing in iV) as long as ^ > A/ (4+3A). 
Assuming commitment is not feasible, (2.32) and (2.34) can be used to compare 
tariffs and quotas. Clearly if <t* \]jN > l], then quotas dominate tariffs; comparably, if 
tf  > t '  then tariffs dominate quotas (for {NJi -1) + (iV -1)// < 0). Thus the ambiguity arises 
only for &l>t' >t'. Using the same reasoning as earlier, tariffs will dominate quotas if and 
only if ^ -1* > t '  -1'. Hence, tariffs are superior to quotas if and only if A'^ < 0 where: 
A" + A))[(W + 1)]+(2 + A) A.(Nfi-V)+- < 0  
Finally, in some extreme cases, an importing country can end up worse off than if it 
had no market power at all on the world market. In the case of tariffs, the condition is: 
2(N-l)ju+ANJi(2 + A) + X\NJ2-l)<0 (2.36) 
The inequality in (2.36) implies the policy active importers would collectively be better off if 
they had precommitted to pursue free trade. In the quota game, market power is collectively 
disadvantageous if; ^iN{l + A.) + A^ (JN -1) < 0. 
2.6 - Conclusion 
We have shown that tariffs and quotas are not equivalent protection instruments in a 
strategic setting where importing countries have purchasing power on the world market over 
a certain good. Each policy active importer would be better off" by colluding and setting their 
trade instrument cooperatively. If production lags are present, the ex-ante optimal policy is 
not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve 
is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we have shown that the importers' inability to 
precommit to their trade instrument may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. 
The negative welfare implication of non-cooperative behavior may be balanced off" by the 
welfare effect of the ex-post elasticity. Given the structure of the world market, these 
conclusions extend to any dynamic framework in which some inputs are committed before 
trade decisions are made. The political reasons why the government does not, or cannot, 
precommit itself to a predetermined policy is not the focus of the paper. However, it could 
very well be an interesting exercise to explain the preconunitment incapability of the 
importers. 
The next chapter extends the model by adding another stage to the time consistency 
game. Suppose that the timing of economic decisions is modified as follows: First, 
governments of the policy active countries announce a tax/subsidy they will pay domestic 
producers as well as the tariff" rate. Next, domestic and foreign production is made according 
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to producers' price expertations. Assuming precommitment is not feasible, each policy 
active government can revise the tariff rate or the production tax/subsidy. Finally, 
consumption decisions and trade are carried out. Lapan (1988) has shown that, with a single 
large country, the optimal production policy is a tax on domestic production of the 
importable. The purpose is to signal foreign producers to increase their production. If it 
were possible, a government would want to assure foreign producers they will not exploit the 
lower ex-post elasticity once production is made. The appropriate questions to answer are 
the following. Do policy active importers have any incentive to use a production tax and/or 
subsidy? Would the production policy result in a higher or lower welfare for those nations? 
Is an agreement to limit domestic production policies beneficial? 
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CHAFFER 3. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND 
TIME CONSISTENT TRADE POLICIES 
3.1 - Introduction 
Governments have a multitude of policy instruments available to implement an even 
larger variety of objectives. More often than not, those instruments do not yield equivalent 
results. It is well known that the optimal policy for a large country which can influence the 
price at which it imports a good is to set a tariff (or tariff equivalent quota) equal to the 
inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity [Johnson (1953)]. Governments can rely on 
commercial policy to increase social welfare by improving its terms of trade at the expense 
of increased domestic deadweight loss. Casual observation of conmiercial policy reveals that 
coimtries usually use a large combination of instruments. We ft^equently observe a trade 
policy co-existing with some form of domestic production policy in a given sector of the 
economy. However, the terms of trade argument in protection does not offer any rationale to 
use domestic production policies in conjunction with trade policy in a static framework. 
One notable critique of the optimal tariff argument resides in determining the 
appropriate timing to use such a policy. This chapter assumes that production and 
consumption decisions are made sequentially and that the level of trade policy can be revised 
between the two stages.^ This setting obviously applies to agricultural markets with spring 
planting and ^1 harvest. It also naturally applies to any setting where firms' input decisions 
 ^ International agreements generally put a on the level of protection. However trade agreements generally 
do not prevent any country from changing their policy through rime as long as it respects the established 
ceilings in the level of protection. Of course, if the cap on the level of protection is lower than the optimal trade 
policy, the time inconsistency problem does not arise. 
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are chosen sequentially.' The production tax/subsidy and consumption tax components of a 
tariff combined with the existence of production lags create an incentive to use a production 
policy as a partial conmiitment mechanism when countries can not credibly commit to their 
trade policy. The key assumption is to allow importers to revise their trade policy once 
production decisions are made. We propose to extend the model of chapter two to allow N 
policy active importers to capture the terms of trade gain with a production policy and a trade 
instrument. The market structure implies a non-equivalence of the different trade 
instruments along with a similar non-equivalence among production policies. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we want to examine if large importers 
have any private incentives to use a production policy along with a trade instrument. Second, 
we want to investigate the welfare implications of using a production policy. The first 
section of this chapter provides a brief review of the literature on domestic production 
policies and trade. The next section introduces the theoretical model to derive the 
equilibrium production and trade policies. A welfare analysis of the various equilibria 
follows. The last section provides concluding remarks. 
3.2 - Review of Literature 
Lapan (1988) has shown that, with a single large importer and the existence of 
production lags, the time consistent ex-post tariff" is Pareto inferior to the precommitment ex-
ante tariff. Once production decisions are made, the foreign export supply elasticity faced by 
a large importer is lower than in the ex-ante case. This gives an incentive to the large 
' The crucial assumption is that inqioiting countries &ce a different residual foreign export supply when they 
revise their trade poliQr. Our argument could be extended to a model where firms miike-. their investment 
decisions before hiring labor. 
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country to change hs tariff announced at the beginning of the game if it did not irrevocably 
commit itself not to do so. Given complete information, for the ex-po^ tariff to be time 
consistent, it requires that producers' price expectations are correct. Therefore, foreign 
producers, anticipating a higher tariff ex-post than ex-ante, will decrease their production and 
both the importer and foreigners' welfare is lower under the time consistent solution. 
However, if the large importer can control production at the begirming of the game, the 
optimal production policy is to tax (or use a production equivalent quota) the domestic 
production of importables. The purpose is to signal foreign producers to increase their 
production. The resulting equilibrium makes every country better off compared to the case 
where the large country is not able to control domestic production. 
We showed in chapter 2 that if N policy active importers behave non-cooperatively 
{N> 1), the time consistent ex-post equilibrium may be welfare superior compared to the ex-
ante precommitment equilibrium. The welfare effect of a lower ex-post foreign export 
supply elasticity due to predetermined output levels, is balanced by the perceived higher 
residual foreign export supply elasticity due to non-cooperative behavior. This chapter 
examines the impact of production policies under the no-conmiitment situation.'" 
We propose to study two different production instruments, namely a production quota 
and a production tax. A production quota is equivalent to a situation in which the 
govenunent chooses the level of domestic production and thus is managing domestic supply. 
Supply management is a much debated topic in agriculture. Most of the discussion on the 
Again, because of the production tax/subsi(fy and consumption tax component of a tarifi^  the existence of a 
lag between production and consunq)tion gives an incentive to use a production policy before production 
decisions are made. However, if irrevocably precommitting to the ex-ante trade policy were feasible, the 
incentive to use a production policy would not be present 
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economics of production quotas has focused on the analysis of producers' welfare. In a 
trade contact, Moschini and Meiike (1991) explored the economic consequences of 
converting import quotas to import tariffs in case domestic production is under a supply 
management program.'^ 
Vercammen and Schmitz (1992) have looked at the transfer of rents following import 
concessions of a small coimtry using a supply management program. Producers, in specific 
circumstances, prefer to offer import concessions than abandon supply management because 
supply management programs generally result in large rent transfers. De Gorter and Meiike 
(1989) have analyzed the relative efficiency of four policy options'^ available to the 
European Community (EC) in terms of their efficiency at achieving the highest producer 
welfare. Their empirical model of the EC wheat sector confirms that a dual system of 
production quota and two-price plan is superior at achieving producer income goals. 
In almost all cases, production quotas and taxes are either exogenous to the model or 
exist to implement some non-economic objective(s) [Bhagwati's (1971) terminology]. In 
this paper, it should be clear that production quotas are used to capture the welfare gains 
associated with the terms of trade argument. However, given the non-cooperative nature of 
the model, the welfare effect of the equilibrium production policies fi-om the importers' 
perspective is a priori indeterminate. The apparent policy makers' preference of production 
" Among others, Moschini (1984) has shown that part of the production quota value is due to the reduction in 
output price uncertainty in case supply management programs reduce the output price variability. Hennessy 
(1997) investigates the economic impact of altered price risk following the introduction of supply management 
Th  ^show that if the objective of the government is to replace a quota with a tariff that rdlects the current 
difference between the domestic price and the world price, the price to domestic producers is left unchanged. 
On the other hand, if the objective is to replace the import quota with a tariff that leaves imports unchanged, the 
producers' domestic price would decline considerably. 
 ^The foiu* policy alternatives considered were; a production quota, a production tax, a price reduction and a 
two price pl^  The two-price plan proposed to maintain price supports for the portion the production sold 
domestically, accompanied by a lower price for the grain exported on the world market 
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quotas over production taxes in the real world is not well documented. While it is clear that 
supply management programs may be driven by political economy motives, we wish to rank 
the production tax and production quota on the basis of a social welfare maximizing goal. 
There are numerous examples of the co-existence of trade and production policies. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC provides many relevant illustrations. It is 
generally accepted that the CAP has the potential to affect the level of world market prices 
[Swimbank and Tanner (1996)] based on the European conmion market size. The CAP is 
also a major source of disagreements between the EC and other large countries like the U.S. 
and Australia. Swimbank and Tanner provide numerous case studies where the production 
side of the domestic agricultural output markets is distorted while being the object of 
protectionist measures on the world market. For example, production quotas are used in the 
dairy sector and sugar industry to restrict producers' supply. On the other hand, the livestock 
sector of the EC is generally subsidized at a very high level. 
A similar pattern of trade and domestic policies has emerged in the steel industry over 
the years [Hogan (1983, 1991)]. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the European Economic 
Conununity (EEC), a major exporter of steel to the U.S., called for mandatory reductions in 
production schedules of steel in every members' domestic market. This resulted in a 
dramatic reduction of the production capacity in the EEC. Similar policies have been 
implemented in the U.S. and Japan. OfScials came to realize that trade policies were not 
sufficient to maintain a relatively high world price for exports. This was done at a time when 
exports to the U.S. from the EEC and Japan were subject to Voluntary Restraint Agreements 
(VRAs). 
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In light of the previous discussion, there are two important issues to address. First, 
we need to determine if policy active importers have any private incentive to use a 
production policy (either a production tax/subsidy or production quota) given production 
lags. The mere existence of production lags is not su£5cient however for the ex-ante trade 
policy not to be time consistent. The important assumption is that countries have the 
opportunity to revise their trade instrument level between production and consumption 
decisions. Second, the welfare consequences of such actions need to be evaluated with 
respect to the no production policy case. Assuming policy active importers behave non-
cooperatively and do not irrevocably commit themselves to their ex-ante trade policy, the 
opportunity to use a production policy before production decisions are made, may decrease 
importers' welfare compared to a no production policy situation. 
3.3 — Domestic Production Policies and Time Consistent Import Quota 
Consider a partial equilibrium model. There are N importing countries with 
purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Exporting nations behave 
competitively and pursue free trade. Domestic demand in each importing country is di{p^  
where pi is the domestic consumer price. Domestic production is denoted by qi. Suppose 
that the timing of economic decisions is as follows: 
1. Policy active importers announce production policy level and trade policy level. 
2. Domestic and foreign production decisions are made. 
3. Importing nations can revise their trade policy and production policy levels costlessly. 
4. Consumption and trade decisions are made. 
36 
Note that once output is determined at stage 2, there is no incentive to change the 
production policy level in a welfare maximizing framework in the following stage. Revising 
the domestic production policy is uniquely a redistributive issue. A change in the production 
policy level has no real effect if all agents are alike or marginal utility of income is constant. 
The time consistent game is solved backwards. At the last stage of the game, the 
production levels of foreigners and importers are known. The domestic welfare fimction is 
the simi of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government revenue.''* All tax and 
auction revenues are rebated to consumers in a lump-sum manner. The welfare function of 
importer / is: 
The objective of each importer is to maximize (3.1) such that 
X = Q(p')-D(p) = ^^m^ and =q. +/»., where X, O and D are the foreign exports, 
foreign supply (production) and foreign demand respectively and m, represents imports of 
country /. We work with a linear model and thus D" =d'' = 0. Equilibrium on the world 
market gives raise to an inverse foreign export supply, p(X,0). Differentiate the welfare 
function in (3.1) with respect to qt, mi and p to get; 
(3.1) 
0 
^ = [Pi -c'(^.)]^, +[Pi -pYm, (3.2) 
In case of a production or import quota, we assume that each inqrarter auctions off the quota licenses. 
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3.3.1 Framework 
The strategy space of the policy active importers is restricted to the use of import 
quotas. From an ex-post perspective, production is fixed and so dqt = 0 in (3.2). 
Differentiate the residual foreign export supply holding other importers' quota fixed to get: 
-D'c^-clm,=0 (3.3) 
where D' is the slope of the foreign demand curve. Substitute (3.3) into (3.2) for and 
divide both sides of (3.2) by dm^ to get country /'s first order condition: 
J" ,  PiQ, = dWjdm, ={p,-p)+mjD' = 0 (3.4) 
Solving (3.4) gives country /"s reaction Sanction: It is a function 
of the predetermined production levels qi and O and other importers' quota m.,. For the 
second order condition of the maximization problem to hold, is assumed to be negative. 
We need to solve for the response of country z's imports following a change in the production 
policy. From the equilibrium condition on each domestic market, we have ex-post 
dp^={dq^•¥dm^)jd[. Similarly, differentiating the equilibrium condition on the world 
market yields: = (dO ~dX)/D'. Totally differentiate (3.4) to get: 
D' 
dq  ^+dm  ^^ 
+ {dX-dO)+dm,=Q (3.5) 
Define a, =d'jD' > 0 and y?, s a./(I + or J Rewrite (3.5) as: 
^+{dX-dO)+^ = Q (3.6) 
~ fii 
Summing (3.6) over all importers yields: 
3S 
(3.7) 
At the beginning of the game, policy active importers non-cooperatively set their 
production policy. We need a closure rule to determine O . From an ex-ante perspective, we 
require that predetermined output levels be consistent with what producers would have 
chosen had they correctly forecast prices. Assuming perfect foresight, we have p* =p and 
thus Q(p*) = S(p) with 5'>0, .y" = 0. The world price is determined accordingly by; 
X = Sip) -Q{p). Totally differentiating the previous identity gives: cp = dXj[S' -D'). 
Similarly, differentiating the foreigners' supply yields: dO =S'c^. Therefore, using the two 
previous equations, we can write dO = (l-Ji)dX, where Ji = -D'l[S'-D') is the relative 
foreign demand responsiveness. Substitute into (3.7) for to get: 
Equations (3.1) through (3.9) hold regardless of whether the production policy in the 
first stage is a quota or tax, given that importers are using an import quota to restrict trade in 
the second stage. 
(3.8) 
Now, substituting (3.8) into (3.6), we get: 
(3.9) 
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3.3.2 Production quota competition 
First, we solve for the equilibrium production quota. Taking as given the other 
importers' production quota, we have dqjdq, = 0,y/ 5^/. From (3.9), we have the following 
results: 
dm. 
^<li 
dnij 
oq. 
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) are intuitive. Given the production quota of the other 
importers, if country i increases (decreases) its domestic production quota, it lowers (raises) 
its imports. The decrease (increase) in its imports has a negative (positive) impact on the 
world price, and thus increases (decreases) other importers' quota, ceteris paribus. 
In the first stage of the game, policy active importers set their production quota non-
cooperatively. To get the first order condition of country /, use (3.4), (3.8) and (3.10) to 
substitute into (3.2): 
dq, 
= 0 (3.12) 
Solving simultaneously the system of iV equations in (3.12), we get the Subgame 
Perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium production quota, q^ along with the specific production tax 
equivalent: o" = p. -c(q"). Let 0^ =Pi-p be the import tariff equivalent of the import 
quota associated with a production quota. The SPN equilibrium 3delds: 
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a;r = ^(l-A) (3.13) 
Proposition 3.1; Assume that symmetric policy active importers can not precommit to their 
ex-ante import quota, but they can directly control their domestic production using a 
production quota. Under linear demand and supply schedules, the equilibrium production tax 
equivalent is positive. Moreover, the production tax equivalent is lower than the equilibrium 
tariff equivalent of the import quota, i.e. 0 < o" < ^. 
Proof: The claim of > 0 is easily verified since 0 < >9^ < 1, V/ and 0 < < 1. To prove that 
co'^ <0^, we need to show that __ <1. This condition is satisfied 
because we can rearrange the last inequality as; -/?. - Jifi.  (l + X ,.,;S,)<o.Q.Ea 
Proposition 3.1 states that the production tax/subsidy is lower than the consumption 
tax. Remember that a quota (or tarifi) can always be decomposed into a production subsidy 
and consumption tax. Consequently, since o" < , the overall impact of the trade and 
production policies in equilibrium is to subsidize production at a lesser rate than the implicit 
tax on consumption. Imposing symmetry, from (3.13) we have that; 
00 
^ = (l->^-(l-^ (3.14) 
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The impact of the variable N in (3.14) is positive: d(ci>l0)/dN > 0. This implies that 
the consumption tax component of the quota increases (decreases) relatively to the 
production tax/subsidy as the number of symmetric importers decreases (increases). Before 
explaining in details the intuition behind proposition 3.1, we solve for the production tax 
equilibrium. 
3.3.3 Production tax competition 
Suppose all countries use a specific tax on production, o}, instead of a production 
quota. As a country varies its tax rate, it has an effect on other countries' production and thus 
unlike before; dqjdq^^ ^0. Perfect competition in production on each domestic market 
determines such that: Pj-<7j=c'{qj). Inverting the previous equation yields the 
domestic supply rule <Jj = -a^). Differentiate the latter equation to get: 
dq^ = Sj(c^j-da-j). From before, equilibrium on the domestic market implies: 
dp^ = {dqi •^dm^)/d- . Substitute the latter term into the former to get: 
where fij=-d'jlis'j-d'j) is the relative domestic demand responsiveness. Using 
dO=(\- 'Ji)dX and substituting (3.15) into (3.6) for dqt, we get: 
(3.15) 
dm  ^ = - (3.16) 
Summing (3.16) over ail importing countries yields: 
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dX =-2:. 
a,{y-n,w 
. . 
da. (3.17) 
Define y^ = aJicCj +Mj) ^[^4] • Substitute (3.17) into (3.16) to get: 
=-rx^-f^i)d'dct^ +djir^ (3.18) 
We can evaluate the marginal impact of the production tax on each importers' import 
quota holding a^yj^i fixed: 
dm. 
dct, 
dm, 
<r-i 
>o,v/ 
da. 
= djirj 
<r.i 
/.(I-a) 
1+ 
< 0, Vy /• 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
Equations (3.19) and (3.20) have a reasonable intuitive interpretation. Given other 
importers' production tax, an increase (decrease) in country i's production tax lowers (raises) 
its domestic production and increases (decreases) its imports. This causes the world price to 
increase (decrease) and thus lowers (raises) the other importers' quota. Moreover, from 
(3.15) and (3.17) we have the following results: dX/dcr, =-\p 'r, (1 - Mi )]y^[l + /j > 0  
and dqjda^ ={\- ft^)\dl-dmjda^^<0. Hence, an increase (decrease) in the production 
tax increases (decrease) foreign exports. 
We have all the necessary information to find the equilibrium production tax. 
Substitute = dXj (S'-D') into (3.2) and divide both sides of the equation by to get: 
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dw, _ 
da. 
o-,^+ip.-p) 
da. 
dm, _dX 
da, ^ da. 
= 0 (3.21) 
Using (3.4), (3.19) and substituting for dX/da, into (3.21), we can rewrite the first order 
condition in (3.21) as; 
dW da — 
da, da. 
= 0 (3.22) 
Substituting for dqjda^ into (3.22), we solve the system of N equations simultaneously. 
The SPN equilibrium production tax under an import quota, erf is: 
o-r'=^ 
(1 + rj)^yiO-- XI + ) (3.23) 
Proposition 3.2: Assume ±at sjmimetric policy active importers can not precommit to their 
import quota before domestic production decisions are made. However, they are able to 
control domestic production using a production tax. Under linear demand and supply 
schedules: (/) The non-cooperative equilibrium production tax is positive but lower than the 
import quota tariff equivalent, i.e. 0<crf <^; (//) The implicit tax resulting from a 
production quota is less than the non-cooperative production tax under an import quota, i.e. 
6)" < a^. 
Proof. It is readily seen from (3.23) that a^ is positive. Also, a" <6^ if the term between 
brackets on the right hand-side of (3.23) is less than one. This inequality holds if: 
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0  + -a.- r , ( l - ( !  +  « , ) < 0  The term [ r . - r , (!->",)] can be 
rewritten as: -a^j(ji^+ a^) <0; and thus the above inequality is rewritten as: 
ZElX1ZL51_»V 
m,+a, 
- fjy^ < 0; proving claim (/). From symmetry, rewrite (3.23) as: 
0 a(\+jiny)-¥y{\-fi)\\ +fi(^n = iX-P) {\+0ji)+in-i)7ir (3.24) 
Given 6, using (3.14) and (3.23), we have that od^—ct" as y—^- We know that y>P 
> < 
since //< 1 and therefore co" <a", provided fi<l. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3.2 states that the equilibrium production tax/subsidy is lower than the 
consumption tax component of the quota. From (3.24), it is relatively easy to see that: 
d(a/0)/dN >0. Consequently, as the number of symmetric policy active importers 
increases (decreases), the production tax/subsidy level increases (decreases) relatively to the 
consumption tax component of the quota. Moreover, from (3 .14) and (3.24), the equilibrium 
production tax and production quota tax equivalent are equal as tends to infinity. 
The economic intuition behind the results of proposition 1 and 2 are fairly 
straightforward. Evaluate the first order condition in (3.21) at a, = 0 
dfV 
da. 
= ( j >i- p )  
<r,=0 da. da. t . 
> 0  (3.25) 
The first order conditions in (3.12) anrf (3.21) have a similar intetpretadon. Th  ^both dictate that the optimal 
policy is to restrict domestic production below the competitive level. The two instruments however yield 
different values for the production tax and production tax equivalent quota. 
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Equation (3.25) can be decomposed into two separate effects to gauge the incentives 
of importers to restrict domestic production. The first term between brackets on the right 
hand-side of (3.25) is the ex-post welfare incentive [Lapan (1988)]. Each importer has an 
incentive to tax production in order to encourage foreigners' production as long as 
foreigners' supply is positively sloped (^<1). In case the foreigners' supply is perfectly 
inelastic (^' = 0=>1—^ = 0) and N equals one, the optimal production tax is zero. This is 
expected since the ex-post and ex-ante residual foreign export supply are identical when 
Ji=l. 
In case N is greater than one, the optimal production tax is positive as dm J da, < 0 
even if S' = 0 (perfectly inelastic supply). This incentive to tax production comes from the 
second term between brackets on the right hand-side of (3.23). This term is similar to the 
standard strategic trade argument a la Brander-Spencer. An importer gains by using a 
production tax in order to shift rents away from other importers'®. Importer / has an 
incentive to tax its own production because of the positive impact on its imports. This causes 
an increase in the world price and, ceteris paribus, decreases other importers' trade quota. 
This provides a welfare gain to importer i as the decrease in other policy active countries' 
imports lowers the world price. The two distinct effects reinforce each other. 
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 answered the first question of the introduction. We showed 
that importers have a private incentive to use a production policy (either a production tax or a 
Tbe strategic trade literature generally focuses on the transfer of rents firom foreign firms to domestic firms 
and on the ability of the domestic firms to export more. However, it should be clear that the qualitative results 
of our model could be replicated in terms of an export subsicfy and/or production subsidy if we had modeled the 
behavior of N policy active exporters £icing a passive importer. 
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production quota). However, the two instnunents are not equivalent in equilibrium. Section 
3.5 examines at the wel&re implications of the two domestic production policies. 
3.4 - Domestic Production Policies and Time Consistent Import Tariff 
In this section, we turn our attention to the case where importers use a specific import 
tariff" to restrict trade. The time consistent game is solved backwards. At the last stage of the 
game, production levels are predetermined. The objective of country / is to maximize the 
sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue; 
such that X = 0 {p*) -  D{p) and , V/ - Therefore, the world price is a function of 
the type: p = (p(Q,X). Totally differentiate the previous function to get: 
(^=-{dX-dO)lD'. Remember that from an ex-post perspective, Q and ^^,V/ are 
predetermined. Totally differentiate (3.26) to get: 
3.4.1 Framework 
The trade equilibrium condition implies that: Q(p')-D(p) = ^ j{^j(Pj)-^j(j^')) 
Holding the tariffs of the other importers and output levels constant, differentiate the ex-post 
residual foreign export supply to get: 
(3.26) 
dw,=[p,-p'^.-m,(^ (3.27) 
(3.28) 
Substitute (3.26) into (3.25) for dnti to get the first order condition of country /: 
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j(T,,. . . ,T^-,q,,. . . ,q^,^ = dWJdT, =(p, -p){Xj^d;+D')+m, = 0  (3.29) 
We assume linear foreigners and importers' demand and supply. Hence, all second 
derivatives of the demand and supply schedules are zero (i.e. d" = Z)" = s" = 5 " = 0). For 
notational purpose, define K = ^d'j<0. For the second order condition to be satisfied, we 
assume Jl  <0.  The domestic pricepi  is determined according to the equilibrium condition 
on each domestic market; Totally differentiate the previous equation to get: 
<3^ , = (dm  ^+dq^ )|d|. Totally differentiate the first order condition in (3.29): 
[k + d'-di\ dq^+dm. dX-dO — — ~ 
d: D' 
dnii +^=^ = 0 
D'  
(3.30) 
Using the previous definition for ok, we have: + -dl^ = 
Collecting terms in (3.30), we can rewrite that equation as: 
dq,-\-dm, 
cc. 
^dm, =0 (3.31) 
We need a closure rule to determine O . With perfect foresight, producers correctly 
anticipate the resulting world and domestic prices after governments have moved. This 
expectation fi"amework is consistent with our game of complete information. Therefore, 
p* =p, and thus Q{^*) = S(p). The ex-ante response of foreigners' production following 
a price change is: dQ=S'(^. Substituting for into the last equation yields: 
dO =(\-'ju)dX. Define y/-=l+^.aj = 1+K/D' >0 and rewrite (3.31) as: 
dm, =- (3.32) 
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Summing (3.32) over all importers yields: 
dX = -
\+fj{y/-\)- a]) (3.33) 
Substituting (3.33) into (3.32) for dX yields country /'s imports as a function of 
every importer's production level: 
^^g,(l-g,/y^)' dm, =-(}.-a,fiff)dq,^ 
R 
(3.34) 
where R = l-fi+(/// • Equations (3.28) through (3.34) hold regardless 
of the production policy employed (quota or tax) in the first stage of the game given that the 
strategy space of the policy active importers is restricted to a specific import tariff in the 
second stage. 
3.4.2 Production quota competition 
This section finds the optimal production quota of the policy active importers. 
Holding the other importers' production quota fixed, we have: dq^ldq^ =0,y/?t/. From 
(3.34), the responses of import quantities to a change in qt are: 
dm, 
cmij 
<?-• 
9-1 
= -2_|^[S-M(l-«,/|y)]<0 (3.35) 
(3.36) 
The expression in (3.35) is negative because i?-//aj(l-a,/^«/')>0. The intuition 
behind (3.35) and (3.36) is similar to the import quota game of section 3.3. However, the 
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response of country i's imports following a change in any production quota is different under 
an import tariff than under an import quota, i.e. dntj |^q^ ^ dm^ j ^ q^ , V j. 
Differentiate the welfere function in (3.26) to get: 
^ = [P, - )]^. + = 0 (3-37) 
Using the first order condition for the import tariff in (3.29) and since, before production 
decisions are made c^ = dX/(S'-D'), we obtain the production quota first order condition 
of country /: 
Solving simultaneously the system of iV first order conditions in (3.38) yields the SPN 
equilibrium production quota, g^^^with the specific tax equivalent : 
(339) 
Proposition 3.3; Assume policy active importers can not precommit to their import specific 
tariff before domestic production decisions are made. However, importers are able to control 
domestic production using a production quota. Under linear demand and supply schedules, 
the equilibrium production tax equivalent is either positive or negative but lower than the 
import tarifE^ i.e. 0—< rf . 
Proof. Define q° such that Pi-c'(q°) = 0; hence qf is defined as the competitive 
p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l  a b s e n t  a n y  d o m e s t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s .  E v a l u a t e  ( 3 . 3 8 )  a t  q ^ =  q f y i :  
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dW 
dq. 
<li=<b 
(3.40) 
From (3.40), co^—O as {l-Ji)-. Clearly, the likelihood that the 
production tax is negative is increasing with // and a. Rewrite (3.39) as: 
G). 
¥ 1 - i" - ) 
(3.41) 
Since both terms between brackets on the right hand-side of (3.29) are less than one, it 
follows that; cojr, <1. Q£J). 
The intuition behind the equilibrium production quota under an import tariff is similar 
to the one under an import quota, albeit there is one important term missing from (3.25). 
Rewrite (3.40) as: 
dW 
= t, 
-0 (3.42) 
dq, dq, 
The first term between bracket on the right hand-side of (3.42) is the ex-post welfare 
incentive. A policy active importer has an incentive to restrict its own production of the 
importable in order to signal to exporters to increase their production. In case of monopsony 
power on the world market {n= 1), the optimal production policy is to tax production as long 
as ^ < 1. In case of a perfectly inelastic supply (.J' = 0, ^ = 1), the ex-ante foreign export 
supply is identical to the ex-post foreign export supply. The incentive to tax its own 
production to encourage foreigners' production disappears. The third term between brackets 
in (3.42) is the strategic trade argument. In the event where iV^> 1, a policy active importer 
51 
can restrict its own production to encourage other importers to lower their imports. Ceteris 
paribus, this lowers the world price and importer i gains from this restriction in its own 
production. This effect reinforces the ex-post welfere effect. 
The second term works in a different direction from the two previous effects, Le. 
l^<I, > 0 • In the import quota game, this term did not appear because given the 
other importers quota, country i does not have any incentive to change its own import quota 
in equilibrium. In the import tariff game, provided Ji is sufficiently high, committing to 
decrease imports may actually raise country /'s welfare. But lowering its imports, given the 
tariff of other importers causes a decrease in the world price and increases other countries 
imports. Therefore a policy active importer does not get the fiill benefit of lowering its 
imports. It prefers to subsidize its own production to effectively preconmiit to lower imports. 
Assuming symmetry among importers, we can rewrite (3.41) as; 
o) 
T 
l + (iV-l)g 
\ + na 
(1 - 7i)(l + Na) - fi(N -l)a- (3.43) (1 - M)(l + Na) - Ji{N - l)a' 4-^(1 + Naf - a' ] 
From (3.43), a change in the number of policy active importers (N) has an indeterminate 
impact on the ratio ajr. 
3 .4.3 Production tax competition 
Suppose a country is using a specific tax on production, oi instead of a production 
quota. Substitute (3.15) into (3.32) for dqt to get; 
dm J = - a jYy- Mj )d'jd<yj + {ifr-a j)clX (3.44) 
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Summing (3.44) over all importing countries yields: 
dX 1 + y 
n -
=-z, (3.45) 
/ { w — a  ) 
Since y^ s /(a^ ), we can define — > 0. Substitute (3.45) 
into (3.44) for dX to get: 
dm, =-dx\-m,y,d<j,+d'w.'z, (3.46) 
The marginal impact of the production subsidy on imports of each country is derived 
from (3.46) holding fixed: 
om. 
da. 
dm. 
<r-, 
> 0  
dcr, 
< 0, vy / 
(3.47) 
(3.48) 
Equations (3.47) and (3.48) have a reasonably intuitive interpretation. Given other 
importers' production tax, an increase (decrease) in country /'s production tax lowers (raises) 
its domestic production and increases (decreases) its imports. This causes the world price to 
increase (decrease) and thus, lowers (raises) the other importers' quota, ceteris paribus. We 
now have all the necessary information to find the optimal production subsidy. Substituting 
= dXjiS'-D') into (3.27) and using (3.29), we get the first order condition of importer /: 
dw, dq, , aw,. dx 
= 0 (3.49) 
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Using (3.47) and substituting for dXldcr  ^ and dqjda, into (3.49), we can rewrite 
the first order condition as; 
' (3.50) 
Solving the system of iV equations simultaneously jaelds the Subgame Perfect Nash (SPN) 
equilibrium production tax under an import tariff aj: 
ct: = r.T 
o-i (1 + AZ, ~ >"Z>« ) 
(3.51) 
Proposition 3.4: Assume that symmetric policy active importers can not precommit to their 
import specific tariff before domestic production decisions are made. However, they are able 
to control domestic production using a production tax. Under linear demand and supply 
schedules; (/) The equilibrium production tax can be either positive or negative, but is 
smaller than the time consistent import tariff, i.e. 0—erf < rf; (//) The production tax is 
higher than the tax equivalent production quota in equilibrium, of < a]. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The intuition behind proposition 3.4 is identical to the intuition behind proposition 
3.3. Figure 3.1 summarizes the incentives for policy active importers to control domestic 
production for both the import quota and import tariff game. 
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Domestic 
Production Policy 
Impact on other importers 
N> 1 
\rq. =>T77  ^=> 
Lnport quota game^ reason to change 
/n, given m., 
Import tariff game 
S — 0 => // — 1 y impact 
•S" >0 <1 
Figure 3.1 Decomposition of importers' incentives to control domestic production in the 
import quota and import tariff games. 
Each importer has an incentive to tax domestic production to encourage foreigners to 
produce more if S' >0. There exists also an incentive to tax domestic production to reduce 
other countries' imports. These two effects reinforce each other. A third effect induces 
importers to subsidize production. If ^ is sufficiently high, it may be desirable for a policy 
active importer to lower its imports from an ex-post perspective. However, an importer 
would not want to use tariffs for this purpose because a decrease in imports caused by an 
increase in the tariff of importer / induces a decrease in the world price and therefore 
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encourages other countries to import more. This is not desirable from country i 's 
perspective. Therefore, a production subsidy is preferable to an increase in tariff to lower 
imports. 
We have demonstrated that policy active importers have incentives to use domestic 
production instruments if they can not commit to their trade policy before production 
decisions are made. Whether, in a symmetric equilibrium, the importers actually gain from 
the flexibility to use production policies is however left to determine. This section intends to 
answer the question using the collusive production policy as a benchmark to compare welfare 
levels under the SPN equilibrium policy and the no production policy case. 
First, note that there is equivalence between the production tax and production quota 
either with collusive behavior or when 1. We assume non-cooperative behavior among 
importers in the latter stage of the game when setting their trade instrument. However, as a 
reference tool, we define collusive welfare, as the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus 
and government revenue of the n importers. Since in a symmetric equilibrium all importers 
get the same welfare, this is an appropriate measure to determine the optimal collusive 
production policy. First, assume that the strategy space of the trade policy is restricted to 
import quotas. The collusive welfare function is: 
Differentiating (3.52) with respect to qt holding other importers production quota 
fixed, we have: 
3.5 - Welfare Implications of Production Policies 
(3.52) 
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(3.53) 
3.5.1 Import quota game 
In a symmetric equilibrium, Pj = . Using dX = (S'-D')c^ and the ex-post 
first order condition for the import quota maximization problem in (3 .4) yields the first order 
condition of country i: 
where the superscripts indicate the equilibrium under a collusive production instrument 
and non-cooperative import quota. Evaluate (3.54) at such that p^ -c'(q°) = 0 to get; 
Proposition 3.5; Assume symmetric policy active importers who are restricted to use an 
import quota for their trade instrument. Under linear demand and supply schedules; (/) The 
optimal collusive production tax is always lower than the SPN equilibrium production tax 
and the equilibrium production tax equivalent quota; (//) Welfare under both the equilibrium 
production tax and production quota is lower than under the time consistent solution without 
any production policy if NJi > 1. In case where NJi < 1, the welfare effect is ambiguous. 
(3.54) 
dWJdq} _ 0—0 as S'since dXjdq, <0. Therefore, co'^—O as NJi—I. 
Proof. Evaluate (3.12) at the collusive solution q^ = q*"" to get; 
The signing of (3.55) comes jfrom (3.8) and (3.11). We have: q" < q*" and since c" > 0, it 
implies o" > o?*". From proposition 3.2, we have: a^xo" > a)''", proving claim (/). The 
proof for the second part of proposition 3.5 comes from the definition of collusive behavior 
and the second order condition d^Wfdq^ < 0. The collusive production quota solution brings 
the highest welfare level attainable for every symmetric importer, given the trade policy rule. 
Therefore, if the optimal collusive production policy 5aelds a negative production tax 
(subsidy), the inability (or an irrevocable commitment not) to control domestic production in 
the first stage must be welfare superior as the non-cooperative equilibrium entails a positive 
tax on domestic production. From (3.54), this happens if In case both the optimal 
collusive and non-cooperative solutions entail a positive tax (erf >0" xa,*" >0), the 
welfare impact of controlling production is indeterminate. Q£.D. 
Under the assumption of linear demand and supply schedules, from (3.4), the reaction 
function of country / has the form: +k^Q -^k^q^ > where ko, ki, k2 and ksj 
are constants. Solving for m, implies that the imports of each country are linear in O and qj, 
y/. Differentiating the welfare function in (3.1), we have; 
The inverse domestic 
demand, marginal cost and inverse export supply function are linear in their arguments. 
Hence, the second derivative of the welfare function with respect to is a constant and thus 
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the welfare function is quadratic in qi. Since the production tax is linear in domestic 
production, the welfare fimction is also quadratic in the production tax Oi. This property of 
the welfare function is important to gauge the wel^e implications of the equilibrium 
policies. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the different welfare implications of the production quota and 
production tax under an import quota. Since the production tax equivalent quota in 
equilibrium is positive, the condition for the production quota to be welfare superior to the no 
production policy case is: 2(o''"-ccT >0. Using (3.13) and (3.54), this condition can be 
written as: Ji< The solid lines in figure 3.2 trace out the previous 
lN-\ + 0N-2)a 
equation as a function of a. For a given value of N/\£ Ji is located above (below) the solid 
line, the ability to control domestic production lowers (improves) welfare from the policy 
active importers' perspective. As N increases, the area under the curve decreases and 
therefore, the likelihood that a production quota is welfare improving is decreasing with N. 
In case of a production tax, the inequality 2a>*'" -cf" >0 implies that the ability to 
tax domestic production at the beginning of the game is welfare improving. Using (3.23) and 
(3.54), the solution for this inequality is given in Appendix B. The dotted lines in Figure 3.2 
illustrate the different values of // as a function of a for which the importer's welfare is 
equal under a production quota and no production policy. In case ^ lies above (below) the 
dotted line for any given value oiN, the ability to tax domestic production is welfare inferior 
(superior) to the situation where importers are collectively committed not to use any 
production policy. 
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Figure 3.2 Welfare implications of the SPN equilibrium production tax and production quota 
under an import quota 
Note that, in appendix B, the parameter y is function of fx. Therefore, the results in 
figure 1 are not invariant to the relative demand responsiveness of importers for the import 
quota/production tax game. The dotted lines in figure 1 are traced out fixing the value of fi 
at 0.1. Simulations showed that increasing fx only reduces the distance between the solid 
and dotted lines for a given N. In other words, as the relative domestic demand 
responsiveness increases (decreases) the likelihood that a production tax increases 
(decreases) welfare is increasing (decreasing). The potential effect of the parameter fj. on 
importer's welfare seems very small in the import quota game. 
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Figure 3.2 is conformed to the theoretical results of section 3.3. In case importers can 
not commit to their ex-carte import quota, the ability to impact domestic production is welfare 
improving only if Jt is sufficiently small. In other words, the ex-ante residual foreign export 
supply must be sufficiently different from the ex-post supply. Naturally, because 
or" >0)"' > co'", using a production quota is always welfare superior to a production tax. 
Therefore, for a given N, the solid line associated with the import quota/production quota 
game always lies above the respective dotted line of the import quota/production tax case. 
3.5.3 Import tariff game 
Similarly to the previous section, we can investigate the welfare implications of the 
production tax and quota under an import tariff Non-cooperative behavior once production 
decisions are made implies: = 0. Dropping all subscripts because of 
symmetry among the policy active importers, we can substitute the previous expression into 
(3.53) to yield the first order condition of importer /: 
^ = = 0 (3.56) 
where denotes the equilibrium collusive production policy with an import tariff. Since 
dXldq,<Q, evaluating (3.56) at yields; dWldq\^_^—0 as 
\-NJi-NJi{N-\)a—0. Therefore = q)'^—0 as l-NJi-Nju{N-l)a—0. 
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Proposition 3.6: Assume symmetric policy active importers who can revise their import 
tariff once production decisions are made. Under linear demand and supply schedules: (i) 
The optimal collusive production tax is always lower than the SPN equilibrium production 
tax and the SPN equilibrium production tax equivalent quota, cr; >g>,*'; (w) If 
(l-^(l + A^a)-(A^-l)^a- <0, the ability to control the level of domestic production is 
welfare improving compared to a commitment not to use any production policies; (///) If 
> 0>l-N/2-N/2(N-l)a, the ability to control domestic 
production is welfare decreasing; (rv) If I-N^-N^(N-l)a >0, the welfare ranking 
between the SPN equilibrium production quota and the no-production policy is ambiguous. 
Proof. Evaluate (3.42) at the collusive solution q, = q'' to get; 
From (3.57), we have: <q'^ and since c">0, it implies co] xo"^. Furthermore, from 
proposition 3.4, we have: a] > (o\ > eo'^. The proofs of claims (ii) through (iv) come from 
the definition of collusive behavior. The collusive solution brings the highest welfare level 
attainable for all symmetric importers. From (3.51), + <0 
implies the SPN equilibrium production tax equivalent is negative. The ability to control the 
level of domestic production is welfare improving since, from claim (/), we have 
Oxo^xo'/; proving claim (/7). From (3.51) and (3.56), the inequality 
(1 - ^ (l + Na) -{N- lyjua^ > 0 > 1 - NJi - NJi{N - l)a implies a>'^ < 0 < of. Thus, 
(^•-l)^ + [i\^- —WiV-l)a- <0 
V  v ^ j  
(3.57) 
dq, Ryr 
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welfare is higher if we can prevent importers to control domestic output, proving claim (Jif). 
Finally, under the conditions of the fourth claim, (3.56) implies; 0 < co'J < o,' and hence the 
welfare ranking is ambiguous. QJE.D. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the welfare implications of a production quota given the 
importers are restricted to use an import tariff for their trade instrument. As stated in 
proposition 3.6, if the non-cooperative production policy is to choose output above the 
competitive level, the ability to control production is welfare improving from the importers' 
perspective as compared to an irrevocable commitment not to control domestic production. 
Using (3.39), this condition is satisfied if: Ji>(p{a,N) = y/l{yr+{N-\)a'). 
For a given value of N and cc, \f Ji is located above the dotted curve in figure 3.3, 
controlling production is welfare improving. It is easy to see that q)^ <0. Hence, an 
increase (decrease) in the number of policy active importers increases (decreases) the 
likelihood that the equilibrium production tax is negative. 
In case the equilibrium production quota entails a positive tax, the following 
inequality insures that the ability to tax production is welfare improving; 2CD'^ -CO"' >0. 
Using (3.43) and (3.56), this condition yields: Ji < ^'•/((iV - l)a(2^iW - a) + y/(2N -1)). For 
any given N, a value of Ji located below the solid line in figure 3.3 assures that the 
production policy is welfare improving from the importers' perspective compared to the 
laissez-faire situation in domestic production. 
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Figure 3.3 Welfare implications of the SPN equilibrium production quota under an import 
tariff 
Proposition 3.7: Assume symmetric policy active importers who can revise their import 
tariff once production decisions are made. Under linear demand and supply schedules; (/) If 
-V){a-V)<0, the ability to tax domestic production is welfare improving 
compared to a commitment not to use any production policies; (//) If 
\-Ji--I)(a-V)>0 >1-NJi-NJi(N-l)or, the ability to tax domestic production is 
welfare decreasing; (iii) If I-NJi-NJi(N, the welfare ranking between the SPN 
equilibrium production tax and the no-production policy is ambiguous. 
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Proof. From proposition 3.6, we have: erf xo  ^ The collusive solution brings the 
highest welfare level attainable for all symmetric importers. From (3.51), the SPN 
equilibrium production tax is negative if: -l){a-V) <0. The ability to tax 
domestic production must be welfare superior to the no-production policy equilibrium since 
0>a^>co*^; proving claim (/). From (3.56) and (3.51), if 
— — we have: co'^ <0<cr^; and importers 
are collectively worse off in the production tax equilibrium than under an agreement to ban 
domestic production taxes. Finally, under the conditions of the third claim, (3.56) implies: 
0 < o)'^ < ; and hence the welfare ranking is ambiguous. Q.EJD. 
Figure 3.4 presents the values of Ji for which the production tax is welfare improving 
with respect to the no production policy scenario. First, from proposition 3.7(/), 
1 + implies the equilibrium production tax is negative (subsidy) 
and the ability to tax production is welfare improving. The parameter fx influences the 
welfare implications through its impact on V. Unlike the import quota/production tax case, 
changes in have a greater impact on the welfare implications in the import tariff game. We 
fix the value of // at 0.5. In case N=2, there are no values of a lower than 1 that yields a 
negative production tax (subsidy). As the value of a moves over one, there exists values of 
Ji that guarantees the production tax will be negative. In case the parameter Ji lies above 
the dotted line associated with iV = 2, the ability to tax production in the first stage of the 
game is welfare improving compared to the no production policy case. 
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Figure 3.4 Welfare implications of the SPN equilibrium production tax under an import tariff 
Since ^ldn<Q, the likelihood that the production tax is negative is increasing with 
//. In other words, an increase in the elasticity of the domestic supply will shift down the 
dotted curve. In case N = A, there are no values of a that yields a production subsidy 
independently of the value of ^ if // =0.5. Moreover, an increase in N, has an 
indeterminate impact on the likelihood of the SPN equilibriiun tax of being negative. 
In case the equilibrium production tax is positive, the condition - o*' > 0 assures 
that the ability to tax production is welfare improving. Appendix B solves the previous 
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equation for /z as a function a, n and fl Fixing fi at 0.5, any value of jl below the solid 
lines in figure 3.4 for a given n implies policy active importers are collectively better off 
using a production tax compared to an agreement to ban domestic production policies. 
3.6 - Conclusion 
In this chapter, we assiuned that production and consimiption decisions are not 
carried out simultaneously. Moreover, the importers are assumed not to irrevocably commit 
themselves to their ex-ante trade policy. They can revise the level of their trade instrument 
once production decisions are made. We have derived the equilibrium domestic production 
policies and trade policies for policy active importers who can influence the price at which 
they buy a good on the world market. Because of the non-cooperative behavior among 
importers, price and quantity instruments available to importers are not equivalent. 
If the trade strategy space of importers is restricted to use an import quota, the 
equilibrium production policy is to restrict domestic production below the competitive level. 
The production quota instrument is welfare superior from the importers' perspective to the 
production tax. In case of an import tariff the equilibrium production policy may be to 
subsidize production. We derive conditions under which the ability of each importers to 
intervene on its domestic market increases welfare. Using numerical simulations, we relate 
those conditions to restrictions on the supply and demand elasticities of the model. Generally 
speaking, importers are likely to gain from using a production policy if the ex-post and ex-
ante residual foreign export supply curve are either very different or very similar from one 
another. 
This paper rationalizes the argument for a large importer to use both production and 
trade policies to increase welfare in case there is a lag between production and consumption 
decisions and they can not commit to their trade policy. If trade agreements do not prevent 
importers from using production policies, the numerical simulations have shown that there 
®dsts a possibility for importers to enter in a prisoner's dilemma. Given the opportunity to 
set a production tax or control production directly, importers will do so, even though in 
equilibrium, it is likely to be welfare inferior to an agreement to ban production policies. 
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CHAPTER 4. PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND 
ENDOGENOUS PRECOMMITMENT IN TRADE POLICY 
4.1 - Introduction 
The topic of quantity or price leadership versus simultaneous play in the standard 
oligopoly literature has been studied in detail. With one notable exception [Syropoulos 
(1995)], country specific leadership in trade policy has never fixlly been explored. While a 
few studies have looked at the implication of firms' timing of moves within a strategic trade 
fi-amework, the oligopoly theory suggests a natural extension to the time consistency game 
introduced in chapter two. One explanation for the lack of research in trade policy leadership 
is the potential absence of any argument to explain a heterogeneous timing of moves in trade 
policy among governments. 
Uncertainty may create different timing incentives in trade policy for governments 
depending on the information set of firms/consumers and policy makers. Suppose there 
exists a lag between production and consumption decisions and that each policy active 
importer can choose to adopt a policy/regime that makes revision costly. Given the 
commitment decision of other countries, a policy active importer may either prefer to 
precommit to its trade policy or use the flexibility to revise its policy after production 
decisions are made if additional information is revealed. 
The production lag assumption is particularly relevant in agricultural markets. There 
may, for example, exist uncertainty in production due to weather patterns. Governments may 
not have complete information on weather conditions at the time they set their trade policy if 
they move before firms. In a setting, where there exists a lag between firms' investment 
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decisions and labor hiring decisions, uncertainty in technology could create the same 
incentives discussed above if additional information on the technology shock is revealed after 
capital decisions were made. 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer two questions. First, we wish to endogenize 
the precommitment decision of two policy active importers given that they are allowed either 
to commit to their trade policy before production decisions are made and uncertainty 
resolved or choose to revise their trade policy once production decisions are made and 
additional information revealed. This question seems most relevant since chapter 2 assumed 
exogenous commitment decisions. Second, we wish to analyze whether two importers can 
enter into a prisoner's dilemma. Given the non-cooperative nature of our model, importers 
may choose a Pareto dominated outcome in equilibrium if we endogenize their 
precommitment decisions. 
Uncertainty is introduced to model asymmetries among the strategic importers. In 
contrast, the previous chapters mainly relied on the assumption of symmetry among 
importers to derive some of the results. The strategy space of importers is restricted to the 
physical quantity of imports. Domestic production in each importing country is subject to a 
random shock. In this case, there is an option value from retaining flexibility by setting the 
optimal policy once production decisions (and outcomes) are made if additional information 
is available. The value of revising the trade policy must be weighted against the strategic 
value of conunitting to a policy at the beginning of the game. The randonmess in domestic 
production allows for the possibility of asjonmetric equilibria if production risk is specific to 
each importer. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
review of the literature on the endogenous timing of moves in oligopoly theory. We 
introduce the theoretical framework in the following section. We study a monopsony market 
and measure the welfare trade-off between precommitting to a trade policy before production 
decisions are made versus keeping the flexibility to revise its trade policy once uncertainty is 
resolved and production decisions are made. The next section analyzes the import quota 
endogenous commitment game for two policy importers under uncertainty. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented along with possible extensions. 
4.2 - Review of Literature 
Dowrik (1986), and Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) have analyzed the endogenous 
timing of moves in a duopoly model without uncertainty. Hamilton and Slutsky considered 
two specific types of game. Under their first assumption, the first stage of the game consists 
of two firms announcing the time at which they choose an action and are conmiitted to this 
choice. In the second stage, a firm selects its action knowing when the other will make her 
decision. This is called the observable delay extended game. If the two firms have 
downward sloping reaction fiinctions (as in a quantity setting game with output being 
strategic substitutes), the unique equilibrium is a simultaneous move equilibrium. In the case 
of a price setting game with both firms' reaction flmction sloping upward, the extended game 
has multiple equilibria, where each firm prefers to be the follower. 
In their second extended game, leadership means committing to a particular action 
whether or not the rival attempts to lead or follow. Thus, the leadership action must be 
chosen without observing the timing of the opponent's move. In this game with action 
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commitment, both simultaneous play and each waiting and the other playing its Stackelberg 
leader choice in the first period are equilibria in the quantity game. 
Spencer and Brander (1991) considered a strategic duopoly setting in which 
uncertainty creates an option value fi-om retaining flexibility by delaying output decisions 
until after market demand uncertainty is resolved. The value of flexibility is weighted 
against the strategic value of precommitment. They also characterize the profit trade-off 
between flexibility and capital stock preconunitment for an incumbent confi-onted with the 
possibility of entry by a firm with uncertain costs. 
Syropoulos (1994) has endogenized trade policies in a bilateral monopoly model 
(two-good, two-country world). In the first stage, both countries declare simultaneously 
whether they wish to move early or late. A declaration of the type [Early{E)^ or 
[LateiL)^.} implies that both players set their trade instrument simultaneously at the first or 
second stage. A declaration \ejj\ or [Z,£] implies that one county becomes the leader while 
the other is the follower. If the strategy space is restricted to a quota, moving simultaneously 
will cause the asymptotic elimination of trade [Rodriguez's result (1974)]. If countries play a 
leader-follower game, the equilibrium is welfare superior to a simultaneous move game; as a 
follower, the individual country can exercise its market power in trade. 
In Syropoulos' tariff game, the Nash equilibrium entails a positive trade flow if the 
tariff reaction fiinction are negatively sloped everywhere (tariffs are strat^c substitutes 
throughout the strategy space). Sequential play arises if both reaction functions are 
increasing in the neighborhood of the Coumot Nash equilibrium. As an extension, the 
second stage of the game is modified so that governments choose the type of instruments and 
the level of protection. If the first stage of the game results in a simultaneous move, tariffs 
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are superior to quotas by an iterated dominance argument. In a sequential play, it is shown 
that: (i) the policy leader will always prefer to intervene with tariffs; and (ii) the follower is 
indifferent between using tariffs and quotas. 
4.3 - Precommitmeiit and Production Uncertainty under Monopsony Power 
The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of uncertainty on the 
precommitment decision of a policy active importer if there exists a lag between production 
and consumption decisions. We change the world market structure of the previous chapters 
to consider the case of a single policy active importer. This diversion has one primary 
purpose. It makes the strategic trade-off between commitment and uncertainty more 
apparent since strategic interactions among importers are assumed away. We come back to 
an oligopsonistic market structure in the next section. The critical assumption is that 
producers and government do not have the same information set when making their 
decisions. Assume the following timing of events: 
1. Government chooses its trade policy 
2. Random disturbance in production is observed 
3. Production decisions are made 
4. Government can revise its trade policy 
5. Consumption and trade decisions are made. 
Producers' cost function in the importing coimtry is subject to a linear random shock. 
Foreigners' supply schedule is known with certainty. Producers in both countries are 
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assumed to know the realization of the shock/^ In other words, firms make their production 
decisions after having observed the random disturbance. Hence, firms and the policy maker 
do not have the same information ex-ante. There «dsts a lag between production and 
consumption decisions. If the government irrevocably precommits in the first period to its 
ex-ante trade policy, stage 4 disappears. However, if it did not irrevocably precommit to its 
ex-ante trade policy, the government can observe the random shock and revise its ex-ante 
trade policy. 
The uncertainty creates an option value for the government of not committing to its 
ex-ante trade policy and revising its policy after it has observed the random shock. Lapan 
(1988) has shown that without uncertainty, a government prefers to commit to its ex-ante 
trade policy since precommitment Pareto dominates the time consistent solution without 
commitment. However, the introduction of a random shock may reverse this ranking since 
more information is revealed to the policy maker once production decisions are made. 
We use a stylized model to assess the impact of uncertainty on the value of 
precommitment. We work with a partial equilibrium fi"amework, and abstain fi"om consumer 
risk attitude considerations.^^ In the case of monopsony power, the choice of trade 
instrument of the policy active importer is irrelevant in a certain world. However, under a 
random production shock, the equivalence between an import quota and import tariff breaks 
It may have been more qjpealing in the monopsoiQr game to introduce the source of uncertain  ^ into 
foreigners' cost fimction as the large coimtiy may have less information about the production schedule of 
foreigners than about his own production schedule. However, the qualitative results are invariant with respect 
to the country specific source of uncertainty in this game. We introduce uncertainty into the importer's 
domestic production only for internal consistency througliout the chapter. 
In a model without uncertainty, qualitative results are giniilar using either a partial equilibriiun or general 
equilibriinn fiamework as long as the import good is a normal good. However, with uncertainty, using a partial 
equilibrium fiamework is equivalent to asgiiming that agents in the model are risk neutraL 
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down. We restrict our analysis to the import quota game since it is the instrument modeled in 
the oligopsonistic world market structure in the n^ct section. 
Denote the world price and imports by p and mt respectively. Importer's welfare is 
the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and the auctioned quota licenses, which can 
be rewritten as: 
d 
W = ^ p{y)dy-C{q,s)-pm (4.1) 
0 
where p{d) and Ciq,e) are the inverse demand of domestic consumers and the cost 
function of domestic producers respectively. The importer's objective is to maximize (4.1) 
such that Q(p)-D(p) = m and d = q+m, where X=0 -D , O =5-^yp and D =a-pp 
are exports, foreign supply and foreign demand respectively. Foreigners are assumed to 
pursue a free trade policy. 
For simplicity, assume the marginal cost of producers is linear in the random shock. 
The cost fimaion is quadratic in output; Ciq,6) = q'llg+cq/g-qe/g. Therefore, we 
have: C^=-qlg<0 and = - Ijg < 0. Domestic producers behave competitively and the 
aggregate domestic supply is: q = -c-it-gp + e. Consequently, a positive realization of the 
random shock s decreases total cost and marginal cost of domestic producers. Assume the 
distribution of e has mean zero and variance c?. In the precommitment case, the importer 
maximizes expected welfare in (4.1). The first order condition is: 
dE[W]ldm = E[ip-p)- mfifi+r)] = 0 (4.2) 
since p = Cq absent any distortion on the domestic market. The world price is determined 
according to the equilibriimi on the world market: p = [{a - S) +ni\J{fi+y). Preferences of 
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2 
domestic consumers are quasi-linear: U(w,x) = w h—x , where w is a numeraire good. 
b 2b 
Hence, the domestic demand of good x is: d = a-bp. 
The domestic price is determined from the equilibrium condition on the domestic 
market: p = \(^a+c)-m-e\lib-¥g). After appropriate substitutions, the first order condition 
in (4.2) becomes: 
dE[W]Jdm = (a+c)iP^y)-ia-S)(b+g)-n{2{b+g) + (^+r)] = Q (4.3) 
Defining X = {fi+y)l]2{b+g)\, a' = a/2 and S' = Sfl , we solve (4.3) to get the optimal 
precommitment import quota: 
(1 + /1) 
Assume the government does not irrevocably commit itself to its ex-cmte trade policy. 
In other words, after production decisions are made and the random shock observed, it can 
revise its import quota. The government maximizes (4.1) subject to the equilibrium 
conditions on the world market and domestic market: Q-a + ^  = m and a-bp-q = m 
respectively. Production levels are predetermined. The first order condition is: 
dWldm = (a-q-m)lb-(a-Q ^ -m)!P-m!P-Q (4.5) 
The production levels Q and q in (4.5) depend on the price expectations of producers. 
Because producers know that the government did not irrevocably commit itself to its ex-ante 
import quota in the first stage of the game, producers adjust their production accordingly. 
Therefore, with perfect foresight, p* =p and p^ - p yield the time consistent solution. 
Equation (4.5) can be rewritten as: 
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[(a - c - s){fi+r)-(a- S)(b + g)]p = m[fi(p + + gXfi+/)] (46) 
Solving (4.6) yields the optimal time consistent quota without commitment: 
[(a+c-s)A-(a'-S')] 
(1 + A)+(1-7^/2M (4.7) 
where 7i = ^/(J^+/) is the relative foreign demand responsiveness. The time consistent 
quota and precommitment quota in (4.4) and (4.7) have to be compared in terms of their 
expected welfare. Substituting for p, and p in (4.1) yields the following welfare 
function: 
W = K + - am (1 + >1)_2 . m m H 
X IX 2(l-/z) ^ - a n - ^ s  a + \ - f x )  (4.8) 
where A ^ ( a  +  c ) X - ( a ' - S ' ) ,  K  =  a ' l 2 b - \ - c ^ l 2 g - { a + c ) - j l i p + g )  and ^ = bl(b-\-g) . 
Denote by and the expected welfare under precommitment and no 
commitment respectively. Using (4.4) and (4.7) to substitute back into (4.8), we have: 
E\W''] = K + - 1 //o--
2{b^g)[Xi\^X) (\-jii) 
L J 2(6 + ^ )1 
4^' fia^ 
4I+(1 + 2;1)72] [1+(1 + 2A)3 (I + xm^-m) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
From (4.9) and (4.10), we have as: 
^ 1 f(7i X) 
^2 16(l+X)JlX^[l + XJi] (4.11) 
From (4.11), it is straightforward to see that /s < 0. As the parameter // increases 
(decreases), the expected welfare gain from precommitting decreases (increases) relatively to 
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the no-commitment solution. This is to be expected since a high (low) value of fl implies 
that the preconmiitment and no-commitment residual foreign export supply curves are 
similar (different). 
Note that in the fiill information case ii.e. when government observes the random 
shock before moving in the first stage of the game), the expected welfare is given by: 
Elwl =K+ ^ |^iL_+^^fE:L+j£L| (4.12) 
L 2ib+g)\Ml + A) (1-M) (1 + A)J 
Hence, we have Expected welfare is an increasing function of the 
amount of information available. We have and thus the preconmiitment 
equilibrium is preferred to the no-commitment solution under fiill information. Introduction 
of uncertainty is not sufficient to reverse the ranking between the precommitment and no-
commitment solution. Agents' information sets have to dijBfer along the game tree. 
To illustrate the implications of (4.11), assume the production shock is distributed 
uniformly on the interval [-A0,A9]. The mean of the shock is zero and its variance is 
(r=^A^/3. We have, E\W']-E\^] as; 
> 
Figure 4.1 plots the value of d with respect to the parameter Ji for which the equality 
in (4.13) strictly holds given a value of X. Any value of 6 located below (above) the solid 
line for a given value of X and Ji implies that the expected welfere associated with 
precommitment is higher (lower) than the expected welfare of not committing. 
16(l + A)7U^[l+/l^] (4.13) 
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Figure 4.1 Expected welfere with precommitment and no-commitment in terms of the 
production disturbance variance and the relative foreign demand responsiveness. 
4.4 — Endogenous Precommitnient and Quota Competition without Uncertainty 
In chapter two, we have shown that if N policy active importers behave non-
cooperatively (N> I), the time consistent ex-post equilibrium may be welfare superior to the 
ex-ante precommitment equilibrium. The intuition is that the welfare effect of a lower ex-
post foreign export supply elasticity is balanced off by a higher foreign export supply 
elasticity due to the instrument competition among importers. In this section, we examine 
the impact of sequential play among importers. 
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Consider a partial equilibrium model. There are 2 policy active importers with 
purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. We restrict the strategy space of 
importers to import quotas. Consider the following four-stage game. In stage one, each 
country decides whether to commit to its trade policy or whether to retain flexibility to make 
its trade policy decision after production decisions are known. The decision by each 
importing country is publicly observed. For now, we assume there is no uncertainty and fiill 
information. In the n©rt stage, if either country has decided to precommit, it then chooses its 
trade policy. In stage three, foreign and domestic producers make their production decisions 
based on price expectations. If both countries have conraiitted to their trade policy, then 
nothing can be changed in the following stage. If only one country has precommitted to its 
policy, then the other country chooses its trade policy given the import quota of the leader. If 
neither coimtry precommitted to its policy in stage one, then both choose their trade policy 
simultaneously. Finally, consumption and trade decisions are carried out. 
Domestic demand in each importing country is di(p,) where is the domestic 
consumer price. Domestic production is denoted by g,. Importer's welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and the auctioned quota licenses. The welfare fimrtion 
is: 
The objective of each importer is to maximize (4.14) such that 
^ = Q(P') - D(p) = and = qr, , where X, Q and D are the foreign exports, 
foreign supply and foreign demand respectively and /n, represents imports of country i .  We 
(4.14) 
0 
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work with a linear model and thus D" = d['= 0. Equilibrium on the world market gives rise 
to an inverse foreign export supply, p(^X,0). Differentiate the welfare function in (4.14) 
with respect to qt, nii and p to get: 
 ^= [Pi W ) - )]^ . + [Pr -  P\^i - (4 15) 
The term is equal to zero absent any domestic distortions in 
production. Each importer has two options. It must decide whether to precommit to a trade 
policy level before production and consumption decisions are made or whether to wait and 
delay its trade policy after production decisions are known. 
4.4.1 Simultaneous play 
It is useful to restate the solutions of the precommitment game and the time 
consistency game of chapter two. The domestic price is determined by the equilibrium on 
the domestic market; =d.(j)-)-q^(jj*), where p/® is used to determine producers' 
expectations of the trade policy. In the preconmiitment game, pi = pt and p=p*. Hence, 
O = Sip) and qj = s^ipj). The ex-ante residual foreign export supply faced by country / is 
defined by; S(p)-D(p)-mj -nti =0. Differentiating the residual export supply curve 
given the other importer's quota gives; (S'-D')<^-dm^ =0.  Use the la t ter  equat ion to  
substitute into (4.15) for . We get the implicit reaction fimction of country /; 
dWJdm, = {p  ^ -p)-mJiS'-D') = Q (4.16) 
Solving (4.16) yields; m^ = fifn^) for / = 1, . The intersection of both 
countries' reaction function gives the Nash equilibrium precommitment quota, denoted 
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m^,i = I, 2. The first superscript letter indicates whether country 1 is assumed to have 
precommitted (p) or not (n) to its trade policy. The second superscript letter indicates 
country 2's timing of move. With precommitment and linear supply and demand schedules, 
the slope of each country's reaction function is derived fi"om (4.16): 
Turning to the no-conmiitment game, assume that both countries can revise costlessly 
the quota set at the beginning of the game after production decisions are made. Due to some 
exogenous factor, we assume that they can not (or do not want to) precommit to their ex-ante 
trade policy. The residual foreign export supply curve &ced by country / once production 
decisions are made is: Q-D{Jp)—mj -m^ =0. Differentiate the latter expression given the 
quota of country j to get: -D'< -^dm  ^ =0.  The f i rs t  order  condi t ion implici t ly  def ines  the 
reaction function of country v. 
Solving (4.18) yields the no commitment quota reaction function ln^ = 
i = 1, 2, j .  To derive the time consistent equilibrium, we impose perfect foresight such 
that p* =p and p* = p^. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPN) of the no-conmiitment 
game is denoted by; OT,"" and . 
We proved in proposition 2.3 that < mf. The welfare ranking between the two 
equilibria is however ambiguous. Generally speaking, a large foreign demand elasticity 
and/or a small foreign supply elasticity increases the likelihood that the inability to 
(4.17) 
dWJdm  ^= p  ^ -p+mjD' = 0 (4.18) 
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precommit to the ex-cmte import quota is welfare improving from both policy active 
importers' perspective. 
4.4.2 Sequential play 
In the previous section, we assumed that both policy importers move simultaneously. 
In this section, we assume that due to some exogenous factor, one country moves before 
production decisions are made and irrevocably commits to its import quota while the other 
has the opportunity to revise its import quota once production decisions are made. Without 
loss of generality, assume country 2 does not precommit in the first stage and is allowed to 
revise its quota after production decisions are made. This makes country 2 the follower and 
country 1 the leader.'' Conversely, assume country 1 irrevocably precommits to its import 
quota at the beginning of the game. We solve the game backwards. At the last stage of the 
game, production levels of foreigners and importers are known along with the import quota 
of country 1. 
Country 2 maximizes (4.14) such that O - D(p) = Differentiate the ex-post 
residual export supply faced by country 2 taking as given country I's quota and foreigners' 
output: D'c^-dm, = 0. Substitute for in (4.15) to get: 
dW:,ldnL^=(jp^_-p)+m^/D'= 0 (4.19) 
Equation (4.19) implicitly defines the reaction fiinction of country 2, g^('n,,0,^2). Totally 
differentiate (4.19) to get: 
Note that our game is not a ^ ical Stackelberg leader of game due to the difference in the residual export 
supply &ced by the leader and follower. Hence, it is not obvious that a country will prefer to lead than being a 
follower in this quantity game. 
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{yd;, + 2/Z)')cim  ^ + (2/D')dm, -(l/Z)')dQ + = 0 (4.20) 
Holding O and constants, we have: dm^ldm\-^=-d'^j{P'-^2d!,^ = 
-a^/(y+la^). However, at the time consistent equilibrium, we have: dO=S'<^ and 
dq^ - . Therefore, the effective^" slope of the ex-post reaction flmction of country 2 is; 
dm, _ -/ia, _ -a. 
< 0  (4.21) 
dm^ //2+(l + ^ a2 I + 2a,+l///(Ca,-^ + (l-^a2) 
where = d'j fD', Ji=-D'f(S'-D') and =-d'/(s^-df). The residual export supply 
faced by coimtry 1 is: Sip)-D{p)-g^(mi,Q,q^)-m^=Q. Differentiate to obtain: 
{S'-D')c^-gyiniy^ -dm^ =0. Using (4.21), substitute the previous equation into (4.15) 
forfi^ to get: 
dm, (5'-£)') ( l+7z)a,+/ /2 .  
= 0 (4.22) 
Solving (4.22) jaelds for the equilibrium import quota of country I, denoted m^". 
Plugging back the optimal quota of coimtry 1 in country 2's reaction function yields: 
mf" = . For further reference, evaluate the first order condition of both importers in 
(4.19) and (4.22) at m^ = OT" : 
dw; • S'+D'g^ '  
>0; dW  ^
dm, in=i«r D' iS ' -D ' )  dm  ^
= 0 (4.23) 
In other words, (4.21) is the slope of country 2's reaction function from country I's perspective since it 
chooses nti when production levels are not predeteimined. Hence, country 1 recognizes the impact of its policy 
on production levels of the other importer and foreigners. 
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Proposition 4.1; Assume two syimnetric policy active importers and no uncertainty in 
domest ic  product ion.  In  the Subgame Perfect  Nash (SPN) equi l ibr ium; ( / )  Country I ' s  
precommitment to its import quota if country 2 does not commit yields larger equilibrium 
imports in country 1 than if both importers had moved simultaneously before or after 
production decisions were made. Moreover, country 2's imports in equilibrium are lower 
than the equilibrium quota under both simultaneous precommitment and no-commitment. 
From symmetry we have; >mf > rr!^ > and ni^ > mf > nC > 
Proof. From (4.23), the ability to precommit to its trade policy shifts country I's reaction 
function to the right with respect to its ex-post reaction fiinction. The equilibrium will be 
along country 2's ex-post reaction ftinction. It implies and mT <n^ since both 
reaction fimction are negatively sloped. From symmetry, we also have; < m,"" and 
ml" < nC - Evaluate  the f i rs t  order  condi t ions in  (4 .19)  and (4.22)  a t  the solut ion wf;  
dW, 
Sot, 
dW, 
fn( 
^ S'-D' (14-^^2+//, > 0 • (4.24) 
/wf (1 —IT) 
= - W ^0 (4 25) 
 ^ D' ' iH=mf drn  ^
Equations (4.24) and (4.25) indicate that in case country 1 precommits to its import quota 
while country 2 does not, the reaction function of country I is shifted outward and coimtry 
2's reaction function is shifted downward with respect to the simultaneous preconunitment 
reaction functions. Since reaction functions are negatively sloped, we have; and 
Q.E.D. 
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Since the residual foreign export supply elasticity is higher ex-carte than ex-post, 
country 1 has an incentive to import more if it precommits to its quota before production 
decisions are made. Moreover, since country 1 moves before importer 2 and that imports are 
strategic substitutes, it has an incentive to increase its imports in order to decrease the 
imports of country 2. The two effects reinforce each other. 
Proposition 4.2; Assume two symmetric policy active importers and no uncertainty in 
domestic production. In the first stage of the game, each importer must decide whether to 
commit to its ex-ante import quota or keep the flexibility to rev-ise its quota once production 
decisions are made. The Subgame Perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium of this game entails 
precommitment by both countries. 
Proof. Consider the case where country 1 commits and country 2 does not precommit. 
Country 1 chooses its preferred point on the ex-post reaction fiinction of country 2. Thus, the 
SPN equilibrium under simultaneous no-commitment is feasible for the leader. Since the 
simultaneous no-commitment equilibrium differs fi'om the equilibrium under which country 
1 precommits, it must be true that country 1 does strictly better as a leader 
Now consider the case where country 1 does not commit and country 2 precommits. From 
proposition 4.1, we have that and . Let A[a,i] denote the change in 
welfare between equilibrium a and equilibrium b. Therefore, the welfare comparison 
between and is: 
S6 
The first term between brackets on the right hand-side of (4.26) describes a move up the 
reaction fimction of country 1. Totally differentiate (4.14) to get 
^yldn^=-m^/iS'-D')<0 since, as we move along country I's reaction function, 
p^-p-m^/{S' - D') = 0. Hence, since nC^ >m^, the first term (4.26) is negative. The 
second term on the right hand-side of (4.26) implies m-i is held constant as we decrease m\ 
and so -D')>Q firom the second order condition. Since 
both terms in (4.26) are negative, it must be that is negative; hence . 
From symmetry, we have that precommitting is a dominant strategy for both importers and 
thus the SPN equilibrium entails preconmiitment for both countries. Q£.D. 
Figure 4.2 clarifies proposition 4.2. Point A is the simultaneous precommitment 
solution, as the intersection of the ex-ante reaction function (solid lines) yields the SPN 
equilibrium of this game. Following (4.24) and (4.25), both reaction functions shift 
appropriately to yield the SPN equilibrium of the [n,p] game at the intersection of the dotted 
reaction functions (point C). Since the movement form ^ to C entails a move along country 
i's reaction fimction (A to B), plus an horizontal movement holding m2 constant (5 to C), 
country 1 is located on a higher iso-welfare curve in the \n,p] than in the [p,p\ 
equilibrium. Therefore, we have: > 0. 
87 
45 
/A 
Figure 4.2 Illustration of the precommitment and no commitment SPN equilibrium 
4.5 - Endogenous Precommitment under Production Uncertainty 
In this section, we use a stylized model to introduce uncertainty. Suppose domestic 
preferences of a representative consumer in country / are represented by a quasi-linear utility 
a function; U{w^,x^) = w^•lr—x^ —where Wi is a numeraire good. These preferences implies 
b 2b 
the domestic demand {d) for good x, is; d^=a-hp^, where a and b are positive constants and 
Pi is the domestic price in country /. Domestic producers of the importable good in country / 
have the following cost function; c(qi,Sf) = —+——where is a country specific 
'2-g g g 
random shock with mean zero and variance of. A positive realization of Si decreases the 
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marginal cost of producers in countiy i. For example, the randomness may be due to 
unknown weather conditions at the time each government sets their import quota level. 
Competitive domestic markets imply the domestic supply function is: 
where ^  is a positive constant. 
The welfare flmction for country / is the sum of consumer surplus, producer siuplus 
and government revenue: 
Each importer / maximizes (4.27) such that and m^+m,=X = Q(p*)-D(p), 
where O(p*) = S+jp* is the foreign supply and D(p) = a-^ is the foreign demand. 
4.5.1 Simultaneous Play 
First, we solve the simultaneous precommitment game. In this case, importers move 
before production decisions are made; hence they do not observe the random shock. They 
maximize expected domestic welfare in (4.27) given the other importer's quota. The first 
order condition of importer i is: E[p^-p-p'm.^ = Q, where p' is the derivative of the 
inverse ex-ante foreign export supply with respect to imports in country /. The quota reaction 
function of country / is implicitly defined by: 
(4.27) 
I b+g fi+y fi+r (4.28) 
89 
Denote the equilibrium import quotas of the simultaneous precommitment game by 
Since the random production shock in both countries has mean zero, solving 
(4.28) yields: 
<  =  , . '  =  U  ( 4 . 2 9 )  
2(l + /l) + l 
where ^ = ^ = A = [(a+c)A-{a'-S')], a'^afl and 
S' = 512. The parameter Ji can be interpreted as the relative slope of the foreign demand 
with respect to the slope of the ex-ante foreign export supply. 
Assume that both policy active importers can not conunit to their ex-ante import 
quota. They can revise the quota set at the beginning of the game once production decisions 
are made and that uncertainty has been resolved. Obviously each importer's best response 
function will depend upon the realization of the production shocks, and s^. Both 
importers maximize (4.27) taking as given the other importer's quota. The first order 
condition of importer / is: (rni,qi) -p(X ,Q) + m. /D' = 0 .  
Predetermined production levels are a function of price expectations of producers. 
Firms correctly anticipate the revision of the import quotas. Hence, with perfea foresight, 
p' = p^ and p* =p . Substitute for the world price p and the domestic price in the first 
order condition of country /. The implicit ex-post quota reaction fimction is: 
+m2) = (b->rg){fi+r)m., (4.30) 
Solving (4.30) yields the SPN equilibrium of the ex-post simultaneous quota game. Denote 
this solution by where: 
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27i(A-AsJ 2^^A(s.-e,) (,3,, 
^ 1 + 2^(1 +A) [1+2/2(1+;i)][l+2/172] 
4.5.2 Sequential play 
Without loss of generality, assume country 2 does not precommit to its import quota 
while country 1 commits to its import quota before production decisions are made. This 
strategic game is solved backwards. Country 2 chooses its import quota once production 
quantities are known and treats the import quota of country 1 as given. The reaction function 
of country 2 is given by equation (4.30). Rearranging some terms, we have; 
27!(A-As,) m (4 32) 
- l + 2/i(l + A) l+2^(l-hA) 
Country 1 maximizes expected welfare since it does not observe the random 
disturbances. However, it has fiill information on the distribution characteristics of the 
shocks. The first order condition is: _^^'_^[l+5?W2/5iWi]| = 0. Solving the 
previous equation yields: 
mf" = 0+2.172)^ (4 33  ^
^ 7U+(1+272^X1+;i) 
Plugging back (4.33) into (4.32) to substitute for m2 gives the equilibrium quota of country 2 
in the sequential game: 
^ 7^[2>1(1+2JU)+47U +1] 24-) 
^ [1+272(1+A)][7Z^+(i+27U)(i+;i)] [1+272(1+A)] 
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As a benchmark to compare welfare levels between the different subgame perfect 
equilibria, we need to rewrite the welfare fimction in (4.27) in terms of import quotas. In the 
first stage of the game, each country simultaneously decides to irrevocably preconunit to its 
import quota or keep the flexibility to revise its quota once production decisions are made 
and the random production shocks observed. The decision to precommit at the beginning of 
the game is made by comparing the expected welfare levels associated with the various 
equilibria. Substituting for the cost function, the world price and domestic price in (4.27), 
the expected welfare function is; 
We restrict the parameter X to equal 14. It implies that the slope of the import demand 
is equal in absolute value to the slope of the foreign export supply. However, the particular 
slopes of the demand and supply function may differ between importers and ©qjorters. This 
assumption does add a little more structure to the model, but does not change any of the 
qualitative results. It is introduced to simplify the solutions of the various equilibria. 
Moreover, assume the two random shocks are identically and independently distributed 
(i.i.d.). Hence the covariance (012) between the two shocks is zero. 
Substituting (4.29) into (4.35) for the precommitment SPN import quota, the expected 
welfare is: 
(4.35) 
cu 
+£•, a-{ — 
I (1-
H — ^ 
0- m)J (i-i") 
(4.36) 
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In case country 1 precommits to its import quota while country 2 does not, using (4.33) and 
(4.34), the expected welfere of country 1 and 2 are respectively; 
= (1+7^-(1 + ^ (3/4 + ^ ^ fx ^2 
E\wr\ = K-^  2^(2+3^^(2 + 72) —'^ i2+'fx)o\ 
I- ' J (6+^)(3+47i)'(l+27i)^ 2(A+^)(l+27i)^ 2(6 + ^ Xl-y") 
Finally, the expeaed welfere of country 1 in case both importers do not commit to 
their ex-carte import quota is; 
E\wr] = K + — —  
L '  J (b^g) 
27iA\l+Ji)  ^ + \2fr +9//+2]  
{MJif 2(1 + 3/2)^(1 + 72)^ (4.39) 
, (2H-72)/zg-- ^ fio\ 
2(l + 37i)^(l + 7z)^ 2(1-//)^ 
Since the only source of asymmetry among the two importers is due to the specific random 
shock in production, equations (4.37) through (4.39) allow to solve for , jE[]^] and 
respectively by appropriately replacing cx\ with a\ and vice-versa. 
4.5.3 Equilibria of the game 
Recall that in the first stage of the game, both importers decide non-cooperatively 
whether or not to irrevocable conunit to their ex-ante import quota. In order to build a payoff 
matrix for this subgame, we need to compare the expected welfare levels associated with all 
possible commitment decisions of importers. 
In order to rank the expected welfare levels, we introduce a few more assumptions. 
Assume ^ is uniformly distributed with mean zero on the interval: [-d^A,d^A\. The 
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variance of £} is then: of = / 3. To &cilitate the treatment of asymmetry in risk, 
suppose that 0^=0 and 9^=^^ =(p9 •, with ^ > 0. Consequently, we have: o-f = / 3 
and o\ - / 3. 
As we have seen in proposition 2.3, without uncertainty, the welfare levels between 
simultaneous precommitment and no-conmiitment can not be ranked a priori. Clearly, 
uncertainty creates an additional incentive not to conunit and keep the flexibility to revise its 
ex-ante import quota since additional information can be revealed to policy makers. Using 
(4.36) and (4.39), we have that as: 
3(1 + ^ ^(3-147i+11^-) (4.40) 
^/x{2+AfI)(2 + 9fi+\2fi' +4//^ +^^//"(2 + 7z) 
Note that the polynomial 3 —14/2 + 11/2^ between brackets in (4.40) can be rewritten 
as 11(72 -1)(72 - 3/11). Therefore, if 72 > 3/11, the expected welfare of both importers do not 
commit to their quota is larger than the expected welfare under simultaneous 
precommitment. Under this condition, the ranking is independent of the variance of the 
random shocks since the right hand-side of (4.40) is negative Similarly, for country 2, we 
have as: 
3(1 + 72)^(3-1472 + 1172-) (4.41) 
472(3 + 472)[^' (2 + 972+1272' + 472') + 72' (2 + 72)] 
As outlined in the introduction, we want to endogenize the sequence of moves by 
policy active importers and emphasize the values of 9 and 'Ji leading to sequential play 
among countries. 
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Proposition 4.2: Consider two policy active importers. They can either precommit to their 
ex-ante import quota before production decisions are made or keep the flexibility to revise 
their import quota after production decisions are made and the random shocks observed. If 
the random shocks S\ and ei are distributed uniformly on the interval \-QA,9A\ and 
respectively with 0 < ^ < 1: 
(/) The SPN equilibrium of the game entails precommitment from both importers if: 
'3(1 + 270' 4(2+3^^)'"'' 
^^4(2 +  ^ 77 (3+4/2)^ 
(/•/) under the condition of (4.42), 
(4.42) 
9> 
^I/2 
3(1+72)^(3-147Z+I17Z^) (4.43) 
4/z(3+(2+9//+12/ /^+4/ /^)+/ /"  (2+ 7?)]  
implies that both importers enter into a prisoners' dilemma in the equilibrium of the game. 
Proof. Without uncertainty (^=0), we know precommitting is a dominant strategy for both 
importers. Using (4.36) and (4.38), we have that: (4-42) holds. 
Preconmiitting is importer I's best response given coimtry 2 has precommitted to its quota. 
Since 0 < ^  < 1, it must be the case that j > as well. Hence, the best response 
of country 2 is to precommit to its ex-ante import quota given importer 1 has precommitted; 
proving claim (/). The inequality in (4.43) comes from (4.36) and (4.39). It implies that 
- Since 0 < ^  < 1, it must be the case that as well. Both 
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countries would be better off colluding and agree not to commit to their ex-ante import quota, 
which proves claim («")• Q-EJ). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the implications of proposition 4.2. The dotted line indicates the 
values of 9 for which (4.42) holds with strict equality as a fiinction of the foreigners relative 
demand responsiveness parameter (//). 
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Figure 4.3 Combinations of production risk and relative foreign demand responsiveness 
producing the various equilibria 
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We fixed the value of (p at 0.5 in figure 4.3. Any combination of 9 and Ji located 
below the dotted line yields a SPN equilibrium with simultaneous precommitment (regions 1, 
4 and 6). Any value of 0 and Ji located above the solid bold line indicates that 
. Therefore, any combination of 0 and ^ in regions 4 and 6 implies both 
countries enter into a prisoner's dilemma in equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.3: Consider two policy active importers. They can either precommit to their 
ex-ante import quota before production decisions are made or keep the flexibility to revise 
their import quota after production decisions are made and the random shocks observed. The 
random shocks si and ei are distributed uniformly on the interval and [-<p6A (^()6A\ 
respectively with 0 < ^ < 1. The SPN equilibrium entails country 2 committing to its ex-ante 
import quota and country I revising its import quota once production decisions are made if; 
3(1+2/2)' 4(2 + 3^' -t\n 
< 0 
4(2 + 72)// (3+4/2) 
6(l + 72)'[(3+472)'(l + 272)(2+72)72-(l + 372)'(l+72)(3 + 772+472')] 
72(3+472)'(l+272)[<!>'(2 + 972+1272'+472') + 72'(2+72)] 
-\\n (4.44) 
Proof. The first inequality in (4.44) comes fi-om proposition 4.2; hence we have 
. Using (4.37) and (4.39), we have that if the second 
inequality holds. Combining the two rankings, country 2's best response to importer 1 not 
committing is to precommit to its import quota. Also country 1 's best response to country 2 
precommitting is not to commit to its import quota. Q.E.D. 
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Any combination of 9 and Ji located above the dotted line in figure 4.3 implies 
• Any pair {dJI) located below the thin solid line in figure 4.3 implies 
Therefore, regions 2 and 3 indicate the values of 0 and Ji jdelding an 
asynmietric sequence of move between importers. Since country 1 is facing a higher degree 
of production risk than country 2, it has an incentive keep the flexibility to revise its quota in 
order to observe the production shocks in both countries. However, a low value of ~jx 
provides incentives to country 2 to precommit since the ex-post and ex-ante residual foreign 
export supply elasticity are different. As increases Ji, the relative ex-post welfare incentive 
of precommitting disappears. 
Proposition 4.4: Consider two policy active importers. They can either precommit to their 
ex-cmte import quota before production decisions are made or keep the flexibility to revise 
their import quota after production decisions are made and the random shocks observed. The 
random shocks e\ and ei are distributed uniformly on the interval and \^ <pdA,<p6A\ 
respectively, with 0 < ^ < 1. The SPN equilibrium of the game entails both countries not 
committing to their ex-ante import quota if: 
e> 
6(l + a'[(3-l-47Q'(H-2^2+a^-(H-3j;)'(l+a(3l-77i-l-47r)] 
7Z(3+4^;)»(l+2Jj)[^=(2+97i+12/i' +47?)+7i'(2+Ji)] 
ni/2 
(4.45) 
Proof. The inequality in (4.45) implies that fi-om proposition 4.3. Since 
(p<l ,  implies  that  The best  response of  country 2  
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given that country 1 does not commit is to not commit to its import quota since 
A similar argument applies to country 1. QJEX). 
Any pair (^,7/) located above the thin solid line in figure 4.3 implies 
. Therefore, regions 5 and 6 indicate the values for which 0 and Ji yields 
a simultaneous no commitment decision between importers. Note that, from propositions 4.2 
and 4.4, there exist two different SPN equilibria in region 6. Hence, there exist values for the 
parameters and for which the SPN equilibrium of the endogenous 
preconunitment game is not unique. However, in this region, the simultaneous 
precommitment equilibrium is dominated by the simultaneous no-commitment equilibrium. 
4.6 — Conclusion 
This chapter investigates endogenous leadership in import quotas among two policy 
importers if production decisions occur before consumption decisions. Each policy active 
importers can either precommit to its trade policy at the beginning of the game or keep the 
flexibility to revise its trade policy once production decisions are made. Producers' cost 
function in both importing countries is subject to a specific random disturbance. Firms make 
their production decisions under complete information. However, a government may commit 
to a trade policy before observing the random disturbance. 
Committing to its trade policy before production decisions are made may give a 
strategic leadership welfare advantage. However, the potential precommitment advantage 
must be weighted against the benefit of not irrevocably committing to its ex-carte trade policy 
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if additional information is revealed once firms have moved. We consider asymmetries in 
risk. There exists an equilibrium where one importer prefer not to commit and observed the 
random shocks while the other country precommits to its ex-carte import quota before 
production decisions are made. Both importers prefer to revise their import quota after 
production decisions are made given a sufRciently high degree of variance in both production 
random disturbances. 
100 
CHAPTERS. ENDOGENOUS CHOICE OF TRADE 
INSTRUMENT UNDER PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY 
5.1 - Introduction 
There exists a large body of literature on the (non) equivalence of trade instruments. 
A wide variety of situations have been advanced to explore the topic. More often than not, 
uncertainty, various market structures and different optimizing criteria have been used to 
examine the question. What is most surprising is that researchers have often neglected to 
endogenize the type of instrument used by policy makers. In other words, the strategy space 
of governments is usually specified exogenously. Some research efforts on endogenous type 
of protection have originated from the literature on the political economy of trade protection. 
It has been somewhat successful (empirically and theoretically) at explaining why cenain 
types of protection are preferred over others. 
We have shown in chapter 2 that import tariflfs and import quotas are not equivalent 
instruments in an oligopsonistic world market where countries attempt to capture a terms of 
trade gain. The purpose of this chapter is to endogenize the countries' choice of trade 
instrument. We abstract from any time consistency issue introduced earlier. Therefore, we 
assume that production and consumption decisions are made simultaneously. 
We build a two-stage game. In the first stage, policy active importers simultaneously 
choose the type of instrument they will be using in the second stage. Given the observed 
type of instrument the other importer has committed to use, each country chooses the level of 
its trade policy. This type of game can be rationalized as a repeated international trade game 
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where countries argue whether to use tariffs or quotas and then annually decide the level of 
trade protection non-cooperatively. 
We have seen that import quotas are Pareto superior to import tariffs in the case 
where both importers are symmetric. However, it is generally recognized that tariffs are 
preferred to import quotas under uncertainty. Therefore, we introduce some uncertainty in 
the production schedules of each importer through a random disturbance in producers' cost 
function. The production uncertainty may reverse the ranking between import tariffs and 
import quotas in our model. We proceed to endogenize the type of trade instrument used by 
each importer imder risk. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents a review of the 
literature on the endogenous choice of instruments and on the non-equivalence of trade 
instruments under uncertainty. The following section solves the equilibrium of the game 
where importers choose the type of trade policy under certainty. In the next section, we 
introduce uncertainty in the producers' cost function in both importing countries. Given 
as3anmetry in production risk, the equilibrium of the endogenous type of protection game 
may involve importers choosing different instruments. The last section presents concluding 
remarks. 
5.2 - Review of Literature 
Gassing and Hillman (1985) consider the endogenous choice between a tariff and a 
quota in the presence of a domestic monopoly. The choice between the two instruments is 
made by a policy-maker who maximizes a political support fimction by trading off the gains 
to the beneficiary of protection against the penalty inflicted to the losers from protection. If 
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we assume that the trade policy's revenue does not enter the policy maker's calculations, 
producer rents are higher under a tariff than a quota at any given domestic price. Therefore, 
governments prefer to intervene with a tariff. Although the foundations of the above model 
are ad-hoc and based on some non-economic objective, it still provides some insights on how 
interests groups within an economy can shape up a govenmient's trade policies. 
In a bilateral monopoly framework. Grant and Quiggin (1997) have endogenized the 
type of tariff used by a large country. They assume that each country has an export supply 
function subject to a random shock. In equilibrium, the optimal tariff rule is given by the 
conmion inverse elasticity rule. However, given the structure of export supply functions, the 
optimal type of tariff in equilibrium vary from a specific tariff (semi-log linear schedules), to 
an ad-valorem tariff (constant elasticity schedules) or to a quadratic tariff (linear export 
schedules). Their model can explain the prevalence of ad-valorem trade taxes in the real 
world. In their view, it is evidence that export supplies are believed to have a constant price 
elasticity. Since ail countries observe their own shock but not the other countries' shock, the 
equilibrium of the game is an equilibrium in beliefs. It may not be the case that the export 
supply schedules literally exhibit constant price elasticity. It may just be that the perception 
of policy makers is shaped by numerous econometric studies which have used a log-linear 
specification to estimate export supply schedules. 
Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985) were the first to look at price setting and 
quantity setting firms in an oligopolistic industry. They note judiciously that those mixed 
~'See Vousden (1990) for a normative analysis of the non-equivalence between tariff and quotas under 
monopoly in productioa For a quota and a taiiff yielding the same domestic ou^ut, the quota involves a higher 
price and lower consumption of the good than the tarifE. However, for a quota and a tariff yielding the same 
domestic price, ou^ut under a tariff is higher than under a quota; and thiis producer rents are higher with a 
tariff. 
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oligopolies are likely to exist in reality. In the case of linear demand and cost functions, they 
showed that, for each firm, choosing the quantity (price) strategy is superior to the price 
(quantity) strategy if the goods are substitutes (complements). Under more general 
assimiptions, Sato (1996) proved that mixed duopoly equilibrium prices do not necessarily 
range within Coumot and Bertrand prices. In the Coumot-Bertrand mixed market, the 
equilibrium prices for the price-setting firm are higher than for the quantity-setting firm. 
The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas with uncertainty has been extensively 
discussed in the literature. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977) have compared specific tariffs and 
quotas under uncertainty tor a small country constrained to raise a fixed expected tariff 
revenue. They use expected domestic surplus as their welfare measure. The sources of 
uncertainty are the foreign price and domestic supply and demand intercepts. Their finding 
is that tariffs are unambiguously superior to quota. Their analysis is limited by the fact that 
they used linear demand and supply functions. Young (1979) challenged that result. He 
showed that the ranking between the instruments can be reversed if the tariff rate has to be 
large compared to the degree of uncertainty in the world price, domestic demand and supply. 
Pelcovits (1977) has compared tariffs and quotas when the two instruments are 
constrained to yield a fixed level of expected imports. Specific tariffs are superior to quotas 
in case of random world price. Whether an ad-valorem tariff is superior to a quota is unclear. 
Under an ad-valorem tariff the world price movements are reflected in magnified 
movements in the domestic price. However, Pelcovits has shown that if the demand curve 
for imports is linear, the ad-valorem tariff is superior to the quota provided that the tariff rate 
is not too high. Young (1979) has demonstrated that a specific tariff is a superior instrument 
to a quota given a ceiling on expected imports for a small or large country. 
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All of the above papers have not explicitly considered risk preferences in their 
modeling. One notable exception is found in Young and Anderson (1982). The expected 
surplus measure used in the previous papers is a valid welfare criterion only if marginal 
utility of income is constant. If the uncertainty arises from abroad and the non-economic 
constraint is on the average level of imports, quotas will be superior to tariffs if the 
representative consumer is sufficiently risk averse. Tariffs lead to arbitrage of imports across 
states of the world. For example, if the world price is high, it restricts imports and imposes a 
cost on the economy additional to the one associated with the higher world price. If the 
world price is low, it encourages imports and the country benefits from the positive income 
effect of a lower world price. But this arbitrage also implies that real income fluctuations are 
greater under the tariff If individuals are risk averse, the fluctuations in income reduce the 
attractiveness of the tariff compared to the quota. 
However, all this literature generally suffers from one major flaw. It fails to identify 
why there is protection in the first place. It has been the usual practice to compare tariffs and 
quotas under the expected imports criterion or some other non-economic objective. The 
results should not be interpreted as offering an argument for protection per se. Lapan and 
Choi (1988) provide the ranking of tariffs and quotas under an import-induced externality for 
a small country facing foreign price uncertainty and domestic production disturbances. In 
case the external damage function is linear in imports and the indirect utility function is 
linear in income, their model reduces to the standard expected welfare analysis described 
above. In the more general case, quotas are more likely to dominate tariffs when the price 
elasticity of demand for imports or the elasticity of the marginal external damage fimction is 
large. 
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It should be clear that the use of trade policy in our model is to equate marginal cost 
(or domestic distortion cost of the policy) and marginal benefit (terms of trade gain) from 
trade. That is, if a country is large enough to affect the price of the good it buys, it can 
usually gain by restricting trade below the free trade level. When there is more than one 
country with purchasing power over a certain good on the world market and there is no 
uncertainty, in equilibrium, the use of a quota to exercise market power brings a higher 
domestic welfare than tariffs. This ranking may be reversed under uncertainty. 
5.3 — Endogenous Choice of Instrument without Uncertainty 
Assume there are two large countries on the world market with purchasing power 
over the same good (N=2). Production and consumption decisions are made simultaneously 
by all agents in each country. We assume away the existence of production lags in this 
chapter. Moreover, let us consider the case of symmetry between the two countries and no 
uncertainty for the time being. These two assumptions will be relaxed later. The game of 
endogenous type of protection is as follows. In the first stage, the two countries choose 
either to use an import quota or an import tariff to restrict trade. Given the observed choice 
of the other country's type of instnmient, each government simultaneously chooses the level 
of protection in the second stage. This type of game is solved backwards. Proposition 2.1 
showed that, given country J responds to country /*s policy with the same type of instnmient, 
quotas are preferred to tariffs, i.e. for / = 1, 2. Wf" denotes the welfare of 
country i if country I uses instrument a while importer 2 uses instrument b, with a,b=mox 
T. Since we extensively refer to the previous notation, table 5.1 summarizes the notation 
used in this chapter. 
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Table 5.1 Notational definitions 
Equilibrium imports 
and welfare of 
Instruments Game Country 1 Country 2 
Country 1 uses r, country 2 uses r [r,r] 
Country 1 uses m, country 2 uses m [m,m] mr,w^ 
Country 1 uses r, coiratry 2 uses m [T,m] MR,PFR nC,Wr 
Country 1 uses m, country 2 uses T [m,r] 
For simplicity, we work with a value function defined in terms of imports. Suppose 
consumers in each importing nation have quasi-linear preferences. We can define the 
function as: F(ot.) = argmax 'w^+Uiq,+m.)-c{q.), where m,, q, and w, denote 
<h 
imports, domestic production and consumption of an aggregate export good in country / 
respectively. By the envelope theorem, we have: = A - The quota optimization 
problem for country /, given country j uses an import quota, is: 
Max = (5.1) 
where the inverse foreign export supply p{m^ +/7ij) is defined by the world trade equilibrium 
condition: m^+m^=S(p)- D{p). 
The first order condition of (5.1) is: 
v ' -p-m,W = Q, /  =  1,  2  (5.2)  
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if country i believes J uses a quota. Solving simultaneously (5.2) for both importers yields 
the Subgame Perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium . For the second order condition to 
hold we have that; V'' - 2p' -m^p" < 0. Assume that import quotas are strategic substitutes: 
-p'-m^p" < 0. Therefore, along the reaction function of country /, we have; 
dm, 
dm, 
p'+m.p' 
RF V:^2p'-m,p 
— <0, / = 1, 2; i^J (5.3) 
Suppose that both countries are using a specific tariff. Country / maximizes (5.1) 
such that p^ =p-k-T^ and V'=p{m^+m^) + T^, where r/ is a specific tariff on imports in 
country /. Holding country/s tariff constant, the first order condition is; 
dW, ' _ 
=^ ^  -p-^iP -^P dm. 
dm  ^ \ 
dm. 
\ 
= 0, / = 1, 2; / j (5.4) 
From the envelope theorem we have; = Kj[m^,m^) = V'j-p. Totally differentiate 
the previous equation to get; dXj = {Vj-p'^brij -p'dm^. Setting dr^ = 0 yields; 
dm. 
dm, K-r 
<0 (5.5) 
Substituting (5.5) into (5.4), if country i believes j is using a tariff we have; 
K -p-m^p' 
f y N 
=  0 ,  z  =  l ,  2 ;  i ^ j  (5.6) 
R-p'. 
Solving simultaneously the first order condition in (5.6) for both importers yields the 
SPN equilibrium {m^,m^). Evaluate (5.6) at the solution to get; 
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(5.7) 
Equation (5.7) implies that { m " , r n ^ ^ > { n ^ .  The last inequality only reaffirms the 
results of proposition 2.1. The next step is to find the equilibrium policies associated with 
the mixed tariff" and quota competition games. 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that country 1 is using a quota and that country 2 
is using a tariff. From country I's perspective, tz is held fixed when it is optimizing. 
Conversely, fi-om country 2's perspective, imports of country 1 are fixed when optimizing its 
objective function. The equilibrium quota and tariff solve the set of first order conditions; 
Solving simultaneously (5.8) and (5.9) yields the SPN equilibrium . Evaluating 
(5.8) and (5.9) at gives; 
0, if country 1 believes 2 uses a tariff (5.8) 
- p- mj>' = 0, if country 2 believes country 1 uses a quota (5.9) 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
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Proposition 5.1; Consider two symmetric policy active importers. Suppose country 1 
restricts trade using an import quota while the second importer restricts trade using an import 
tariff. In equilibrium, we have that; (i) m,"' > mj™" and m?' < wHT; and (//) W^' < . 
Proof. From equation (5.11), the equilibrium will be along coimtry 2's reaction fimction. 
Equation (5.10) indicates that the reaction fimction of country 1 is shifted outward. Since we 
move down importer 2's reaction fimction, we have; >n^ and nCT <m^, proving 
claim (/). Since the equilibrium is located along country 2's reaction fimction and that 
country I's reaction function is shifted outward, the equilibrium implies a lower welfare for 
country 2. Totally differentiate (5.1) to get; 
Since we are moving along country 2's reaction fimction, F, — p-m^p' = 0 from (5.9) and 
<^/c3n,|^<0. Hence, we have; WT' <W^. Note that from symmetry, <W^ 
implies . Q£.D. 
Without additional assumptions, we are not able to say anything about and . 
Differentiate (5.1) to get; 
dW^ ={y{-p-n\p')dm^ -m^p'dm^ (5.13) 
Using (5.8), we can rewrite (5.13) as: 
dW^ = -m^p'^O^dm^ + dm^ ] (5.14) 
(5.12) 
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where 9^ =p'f{p'~^,")>^ and can be seen as the conjectural variation parameter. The 
term between brackets in (5.14) has an undetermined sign since a&n, > 0 and dm, < 0 in the 
mixed [m, r] game compared to the \m,m\ game. 
Figure 5.1 explains the intuition behind the results of proposition 5.1. The two solid 
lines represent the reaction flmction of both countries given that each believes the other uses 
an import quota. Point A represents the equilibrium of the [«,/»] game. The equilibrium of 
the mixed [w,r] game is located to the right of A along 2's reaction function. It is easy to 
see the equilibrium yields a lower welfare for country 2. In the event the equilibrium is on 
the segment between points A and C, the equilibrium of the [m, r] game results in a higher 
welfare for country 1 than in the import quota game [/n,m]. However, nothing prevents the 
equilibrium to be located to the right of point C; thus yielding a lower welfare level from 
country I's perspective. 
Given country V s  choice of a trade policy level, country j  will be indifferent between 
a tariff and a quota. That is a country's choice of a tariff or quota strategy does not change its 
own reaction function but that of its rival. When country 1 optimizes, it faces a more elastic 
residual foreign export supply holding tz fixed than when is held fixed. A change in mi 
also affects m2 in the quota-tariff game. Therefore, country 1 imposes a higher quota when 
countiy 2 uses a tariff than when it is using a quota. 
I l l  
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Figure 5.1 Importers' reaction functions and equilibrium of the import quota game 
Without loss of generality, suppose that country 1 believes country 2 is using a tariff 
and that country 2 believes coimtry I is using a quota. The first order conditions of this 
problem are given in (5.8) and (5.9). Evaluate the set of first ordo* conditions at the solution 
dW, 
dm  ^
dW  ^
dn\ 
= 0 (5.15) 
= S(E)1<0 (5,16) 
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Propositioii 5^: Consider two symmetric policy active importers. Country 1 restricts trade 
using an import quota while the second importer restricts trade using an import tariff. In 
equilibrium, we have that: (/) and mf >nC^, and (ii) > W". 
Proof. From (5.15) and (5.16), the equilibrium of the mixed \m,T\ game is along country Ts 
reaction function. Since we are moving down country I's reaction function, we have that: 
and OTT , proving claim (/). Since we are moving down country I's reaction 
function, importer 1 get a higher welfare level in the mixed [/n, r] game than in the [r, r] 
game, >W". From (5.13), since V{-p-m^p' = 0, we have dW^\^=-m^p'clm,>Q 
since dm2 > 0. Hence, > W". Note that, from symmetry, we have: > W". QJE.D. 
Figure 5.2 represents the equilibria of the mixed \m, v] game and import tariff game 
[r,r]. Point A represents the equilibrium while point C represents the potentijil 
location of the equilibrium quantity Point B locates the equilibrium of the 
[m,rn\ game. Point C yields a higher welfare than at point B from country I's perspective. 
However, it is not possible to rank unambiguously the welfare level of country 2 at point C 
with respect to B without fiirther assumptions. 
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Figure 5.2 Importers' reaction functions and equilibrium of import tariff game 
Combining the results of propositions 5.1 and 5.2, we have that: <W^ and 
>W". Hence, using an import quota is a dominant strategy for country 1. From 
symmetry, it follows that using an import quota is a dominant strategy for country 2 as well. 
Suppose we allow both importers in the first stage of the game to simultaneously armounce 
the trade instrument that they are conrniitting to use in a second stage. The pair 
is a Subgame Perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium in dominant 
strategy of this game. In the next section, we introduce uncertainty to allow importers to 
choose a different type of instrument in equilibrium. 
114 
5.4 - Production Uncertainty and the Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument 
5.4.1 Framework 
The purpose of section 5.4 is to introduce uncertainty into the endogenous type of 
protection game. We introducing heterogeneous random disturbances into domestic 
production schedules of each importer using a stylized model. 
The sequence of events is the following. Two policy active importers simultaneously 
choose between using an import quota or an import tariff to restrict trade. However, both 
importers' domestic production is subject to a random disturbance which is not observed at 
the time importers commit themselves to a type of trade policy. Next, the decision of both 
importers is publicly observed. Given the irrevocable commitment of each importer to a 
trade instnmient, both countries choose the level of their trade policy. Finally, both 
production shocks are publicly revealed and production, consumption and trade decisions are 
carried out. 
Preferences and technology are identical in both countries. Domestic preferences are 
a 
represented by a quasi-linear utility function: i7(w,,*,) = w;+—where w, is a 
b 2b 
numeraire good. These preferences imply the domestic demand (d,) for the import good x, is; 
d. = a-bp^, where a and b are positive constants and/?, is the domestic price. 
Domestic producers of the importable in country / have the following cost function; 
CO so , 
c{qi ,sj = -I—'• ^, where is a random shock with mean zero and variance a;. A 
g S 
positive realization of decreases the marginal cost and total cost of producers in country /. 
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Profit maximization under full information implies; = -c+gp, , where g is a positive 
constant. 
Foreigners are passive and follows a free trade policy. Foreign demand and supply 
are respectively: D=a-^ and 0=6-^yp. The world price is determined according to 
the equilibrium condition in trade: p = ——n - m ,  domestic price is determined 
according to the equilibrium on each domestic market: p, = ^ Welfare of (b+g) 
importer i is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and government 
revenue: 
(5.17) 
5.4.2 Import quota 
We restrict the strategy space of both importers to an import quota. Both policy 
active importers maximize expected welfare in (5.17) given the other importer's quota. The 
first order condition is: E\p^-p-m^p'^ = Q. Let A = (;^+/)/2(6+^). Solving the first 
order condition simultaneously yields the equilibrium import quota of both importers: 
2A 
mr= (5.18) 
2(1 + A) + 1 ^ ^ 
where A = (a + c)A-{a' -S'), a' - ajl and 5' = djl. 
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5.4.3 Import tariff 
Assume both importers use a specific tariff r,. There is an arbitrage condition 
between the world price and domestic price if imports are positive in equilibrium; 
p, = ^ + r,. Imports in country / are defined by: 
m^={a-c)-(jb+g)ip+ T ^)-e, (5.19) 
The world price is determined according to the equilibrium condition m^+nL,= X, which 
implies- p = 
Both importers maximize expected domestic welfare given the other importer's tariff. 
The first order condition is; £[?j(5w^/5?,)-/n^(^/5r,)] = 0. With appropriate substitutions, 
the first order condition implicitly defines the reaction function of both importers; 
E[m. - r,(6+^)(l+2>l)] = 0 (5.20) 
Solving simultaneously (5.20) for both importers yields the Nash equilibrium tariff The 
equilibrium import quantities in each country are; 
^(l + 2;i) Sj-(l+2Z)e, 
(l+4A + 2A^)'^ 2(1+ /1) < = r. ' (5-21) 
Note that dm^>0 and dm"/^€^ <0. A decrease in countryy's marginal cost (T^-^) 
decreases country y's imports and lowers the world price ceteris paribus. This provokes an 
increase in imports of country /. For Sj= 5^=0, we have that for / = 1, 2 since 
from (5.18) and (5.21), we have that: 
A Sj -(l-i-2;i)g, Tn  ^ —tn  ^ + 
_(l+4yl+2>l^)(2(l+A) + l) 2(1 +A) (5.22) 
117 
5.4.4 Mixed instruments 
Without loss of generality, assume country 1 is using a specific tariff while country 
2's instrument is a quota. We have the following arbitrage condition between country I's 
domestic price and the world price: =p + T^. Equilibrium on the world market implies; 
_ (a+c)-(S-a)-(b+g)T.-\-TrL, ^ ^ ^ ,, ... 
p ; ' =-. The first order condition for country 1 s maximization fi+r+b+g 
problem is; £[/, {dm^ /5^,) - m, )] = 0. It implicitly defines the tariff reaction fiinction 
of country 1 as a fimction of country 2's import quota; 
((P + gf -(J3+r+b+gf)T^ =-{a-c){p+Y)-(b+g){S-d) + (b+g)mj^ (5.23) 
Rearranging terms in (5.23) we have; 
A m, 
r, = = (5.24) 
2X{b^g)( \+X) 4A(b+gXl + A) ^ ^  
The first order condition of country 2 is; E[p2-p-m,/(S' - D')^ = 0. The previous 
equation can be solved to get the quota reaction fimction of country 2 as a function of 
country I's tariff; 
(2/1+3) ^ 
Using (5.24) and (5.25), we can solve the Nash equilibrium of the [T,m\ game; 
^A(\ + X) ^ m^=-, 2^£i_ ^5 27) 
4yl(l+A)(2A + 3) + l ^ [4A(l + AX2;i+3) + l](l+2;i) (1 + 2/1) 
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5.4.5 Equilibria of the game 
Recall that in the first stage of the game, both policy active importers simultaneously 
announce the trade instrument they commit to use in the second stage. In order to compare 
the expected welfare levels associated with each equilibrium, we rewrite the welfare function 
in terms of imports. This is done by substituting the producers' cost function, demand 
schedules and foreign supply into (5.17). 
E[w;]=K- 1 
2(b-tg) 
———s; +2s^ 
d-/") 
a + -
c// 
(5.28) 
where K = a^l'lb+c^l2g-{a+cYjKb+g). 
Assume that the slope of the countries' import demand and the slope of the foreign 
export supply are identical. Hence, A = 1/2. Rewriting (5.28) gives: 
E[WJ^  = K  ^(J> + g) 
Am, 3mf u , 
— —mm, - em. h ——er + e. 
2 2 • ^ ' (i_^) ' ' a + -
cn 
(!-/"). 
(5.29) 
Under the restriction imposed on the parameter \ we can rewrite (5.18), (5.21), (5.26)and 
(5.27) as; 
3A 4A mi; - = , mr " = —, w:"" = —, /?l" = —4 
13 2 ^ 13 ^ 4 ^ 7 
_ 2 A  .  ( g i - 2 g j  
(5.30) 
(5.31) 
Assume the two random shocks are jointly distributed and drawn fi-om a bivariate 
normal distribution with density function; 
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27tc7^a^^ \- fT 
(5.32) 
From the properties of a bivariate normal distribution, we have that the covariance between 
the random variables is: • Assume also that the standard error of can be 
written as a function of the standard error of . Hence, if o", = ipty^ , we have: a\ = ^"<37 
and (Tj, = p4o^ \ - Using these assumptions, the expected welfare levels of the import tariff 
game is: 
wr=K+ 
wr = K+ 
16A 4/?^ , //g-f 
2(b^g) 
16A' o-j ^ptpcr: jLicr' 
2(b + g) L 
(5.33) 
(5.34) 
Using (5.30) and (5.31) to substitute back into (5.29), we can compute the expected 
welfare levels under the various equilibria: 
Wr=K + — — j — +  I  (b+g)\ 8 2(1-/.)/ 
w^'=K+ — 
( b + g ) [  169 2(l-/z)J 
wr=K+ — 
169 8 2(1-//) 
W  ^= K + 1 f64^' ^ fiol I 
(b + g)\ 169 ^2(1-fi)l 
(5+^)1 169 8 2(1-//)^ 
(5.35) 
(5.36) 
(5.37) 
(5.38) 
(5.39) 
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Consider two policy active importers who simultaneously commit either to use an 
import tariff or an import quota to restrict trade in the first stage of the game. Their trade 
instrument commitment is publicly observed. Each importer faces a random production 
disturbance in his own country and does not observe either shock before making its trade 
instrument commitment. In the second stage, both importers simultaneously set their trade 
policy level given their commitment at the beginning of the game. Finally, production 
disturbances are observed and production, consumption and trade are carried out. Assume 
country 2 faces a higher level of production risk than country 1. Therefore, (j>> 
Proposition 5.3: Assume the random shocks are distributed according to (5.32) and ^ > 1; 
The endogenous type of instrument game is characterized by: (/) The SPN equilibrium of the 
game entails both importers using an import quota if: arj < 0.444/^^; (k) Both importers 
enter into a prisoner's dilemma in the SPN equilibrium of the game if: 
0.872/4p )^ <crffA^< 0.444j^  ^ . 
Proof. The inequality cx\l<QAA4[(p^ implies that from (5.35) and (5.39). 
Since ^ > 1, it must be the case that . Therefore, given country 1 uses a quota, 
country 2's best response is also to use an import quota in the first stage of the game. 
Similarly, since , country I's best response to country 2 using a quota is to choose 
an import quota in the first stage of the game; proving claim (/). Using (5.33) and (5.35), the 
inequality 0.872/(4 + <<j\/< 0.444/implies that . Since ^ > 1, it 
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must also be the case that W^>W^. Since ct\/A'KQAAA/ip-, the pair of actions 
is still a SPN equilibrium of the game. However, both importers would be better 
ofif in terms of expected welfare if they collude and use import tariffs since and 
. Q.EJD. 
Proposition 5.3 states that, given a sufBciently low level of variance in the production 
shocks, quotas are preferred to import tariffs for both countries. As p increases (decreases), 
the likelihood that both importers use import quotas in equilibrium increases (decreases). 
The expected welfere under the [r, r] game is decreasing with p. Intuitively, given that the 
marginal cost in country / is small (large) due to a large (small) random disturbance, country 
i  p r e f e r s  c o u n t r y  j  t o  h a v e  a  h i g h  ( l o w )  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  s i n c e  i t  w i l l  r a i s e  ( l o w e r )  c o u n t r y  f s  
imports and beneficiate (hurt) country i through a higher (lower) world price 
Proposition 5.4: If the random shocks are distributed according to (5.32) and ^ > 1, the SPN 
equilibrium of the game entails country 1 using an import quota and country 2 using an 
import tariff if; 0.444/^^ =/(^)<crf/^^ < /(^,p)s0.939/(4 + ^ ^-4/?^) 
Proof: From claim (/") in proposition 5.3, /(^) < ofimplies that >W .^ From 
(5.33) and (5.36), <j\f < f{(^,p) implies > W". Hence, using a quota is country I's 
best response given country 2 uses a tariff. Given that country 1 is using an import quota, 
implies coimtry 2's best response is to use an import tariff Q.E.D. 
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In the case where is in the interval of [/,7J, country 1, knowing country 
2's best response to an import quota is to use an import tariff, has an incentive to use an 
import quota since it can restrict country 2's imports flirther by conmiitting to use an import 
quota instead of a tariff. Country 2's best response is to arbitrage imports across the different 
state of the world given a relatively high variance in its own domestic production. Note that 
f <0 and f A—0 as <j>—2p. Hence, an increase in country 2's production risk 
—4 ' > < 
unequivocally increases the likelihood of an asymmetric equilibrium in the trade instrument 
if (fxlp. Note that the interval in [/,/] may very well be empty, preventing the 
equilibrium of the game to be asymmetric. 
Proposition 5.5: If the random shocks are distributed according to (5.32) and 1, a SPN 
equilibrium of the game entails both importer choosing to use an import tariff if; 
a\ I A- > 0.939/(4 + -4p^). 
Proof. From proposition 5.4, erf^ > 0.939/(4 + ^^-4/>^) implies that . 
Therefore, using an import tariff is country I's best response to country 2 using an import 
tariff Since ^>1, using a tariff must be country 2's best response to country choosing a 
tariff in the first stage of the game. Q.E.D. 
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Note that the equilibrium of the game may not be unique since the condition 
>0.939/(44-^^-4/7^) does not prevent <t\/from being less than 0.444/^" as 
well. However, from proposition 5.3, the equilibrium where both countries use an import 
quota will be Pareto dominated by the other SPN equilibrium where both countries use 
tariffs. 
5.5 - Conclusion 
We proved that a sufficiently high variance in production risk creates incentives for 
both importers to use import tariffs. This is rather intuitive since tariffs allow for arbitrage 
across the states of the world. The ability to profit from this arbitrage opportunity must be 
weighted against the higher residual foreign export supply elasticity using tariff rather than 
quotas. There exists also a range of values for production risk parameters that entails an 
equilibrium where both importers choose a different instrument. The importer feeing the 
largest production risk uses an import tariff to arbitrage imports across states of the world 
while the other importer chooses to restrict imports with a quota. 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
6.1 - Summary 
This dissertation includes four three chapters dealing with time consistency of trade 
policies. First, we investigate the strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing 
power on the world market for a certain good. Tariffs and quotas are not equivalent 
protection instnmients in this oligopsonistic market. Policy active importers would be better 
off by colluding and setting their trade instrument cooperatively. If production decisions 
occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent 
because the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve is lower than the ex-
ante elasticity. However, we show that the importers' inability to irrevocably commit to their 
trade instrument may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. The negative 
welfare implication of non-cooperative behavior may be balanced off by the welfare effect of 
the ex-post elasticity. 
The following chapter explores the policy active importers' incentives and the 
welfare implications of using production policies and trade polices if production decisions 
occur before consumption decisions. The existence of production lags rationalizes the 
argument for a large country to use both production and trade polices in order to increase its 
welfare if it can not irrevocably commit to its ex-ante trade policy. Production instruments 
are not equivalent under non-cooperative behavior. Provided trade is restricted with an 
import quota, the equilibrium production policy is to restrict domestic production below the 
competitive level. If trade is restricted with an import tariff the equilibrium production 
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policy may be to subsidize production. We derive conditions under which the ability of each 
importer to control domestic production increases welfare. 
Chapter four analyzes the endogenous decision of two policy active importers to 
either commit to their import quota or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante quota once 
production decisions are made. We assume that production in both importing countries is 
subject to an asymmetric random shock. Committing to its import quota before production 
decisions are made may provide a strategic leadership welfare gain. However, not 
irrevocably conmiitting to its ex-ante quota gives an importer the flexibility to revise its 
import quota once uncertainty on the domestic market is resolved. Both policy active 
importers prefer not to commit to their trade policy given a sufficiently high degree of 
variance in production uncertainty, ceteris paribus. Under certain conditions, there exists an 
equilibrium where one country conmiits to its ex-ante quota while the other keeps the 
flexibility to revise the level of its policy after uncertainty is resolved. 
The final chapter examines the endogenous choice of trade instrument among two 
policy active importers. Production and consumption decisions are carried out 
simultaneously; thus we assume away the existence of production lags. The producers' cost 
function is subject to a linear random shock. In the first stage of the game, each govenmient 
corrmiits to either use an import quota or an import tariff to reduce trade in the second stage 
of the game in an attempt to capture a potential terms of trade gain. In the case where 
random disturbances are null, the equilibrium of the game entails both importers choosing to 
use an import quota. If there is asymmetry in production risk, there exists a range of values 
for the uncertainty parameters yielding an equilibrium where one country uses an import 
quota while the other country uses an unport tariff. 
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6.2 - Recommendations for Future Research 
We derived the equilibrium production policies under the assumption that importers 
are not able to irrevocably commit themselves to their import quota. If importers fail to ban 
the use of production policies, the ability to control domestic production may hurt them. 
Given that possibility, what are the conditions for which importers would prefer to commit to 
their ex-ante trade policy (and thus eliminate the need for production policies)? The ranking 
between the precommitment solution and the time consistent solution under production 
policies is not obvious as it involves comparing the two distorted foreign rate of 
transformation with a distorted domestic rate of production and an undistorted one. 
The models in chapter four and five are obviously highly stylized and some of the 
assumptions on the structure of preferences and technology should be relaxed in order to get 
more robust results. The impact of risk preferences on the results could be analyzed using a 
general equilibrium fiamework. However, it is not clear how much would be gained fi-om 
doing so. Import quotas generally induce less variation in consumers' income than tariffs. 
Hence, within our framework where quotas are preferred to tariffs under certainty, 
introducing risk averse consimiers may potentially reinforce this preference. 
Other types of instrument could be analyzed within our framework. Minimum 
Access Commitments (MACs) are increasingly popular in agricultural markets. Under this 
type of protection, an importer commits itself to let a predetermined quantity of imports enter 
its domestic market. This commitment imposes a lower bound on imports and thus differs 
from import quotas. Can policy active importers use MACs to capture a terms of trade gain 
if they are used in conjunction with other intruments? What are the strategic differences 
from the importers' perspective if MACs are used compared to an import quota game? 
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4 
Proof of proposition 3.4(/); Using (3.51), dropping all subscripts because of the symmetry 
assumption, the SPN equilibrium production tax is lower than the tariff if; 
a(l+72\^ + r(l-//Xl + 7^(^-l)n 
The inequality (A. 1) is satisfied if: 
V 
a(l+Wy)+V(1 - //)(1 + - l)V) ail + JINV) + F(1 - //)(1 + ^ (^• - \)V) 
The above inequality can be rewritten as; 
[(2iV-l)a-(Ar-l)//F]^ + a-/zF + 7iF>0 (A.2) 
The inequality in (A.2) is respected if a-fjV>0. Using the definition of F, it is readily 
seen that the latter inequality holds. Therefore, the inequality in (A.2) is respected, and thus 
<<<. Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 3.4(w): Evaluate the first order condition in (3.49) at the equilibrium 
production quota under an import tariff (of); 
dPf: 
da, da, 
dm^jdai 
dqjda, 
dm, ^ dXI da, 
t-ij dqJda, f - i j  
(A.3) 
From (3.34), we have; = Therefore, the first term between 
dq, da, dq  ^ da, 
parenthesis on the right hand-side of (A.3) can be rewritten as; V 
dq  ^ da, / da, 
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Similarly, from (3.33), we have that the second term between parenthesis on the right hand-
side of (A.3) can be rewritten as: V Therefore, 
dq  ^ da, / dcr, da. 
> 0  
implying that al > coj. QJE.D. 
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APPENDIX B. NUMEMCAL EXAMPLE DETAILS 
The inequality la)*"' -a" >0 implies that the ability to tax domestic production at the 
beginning of the game is welfare improving. The solution to this inequality yields: 
—  ^  2 N y ( l - - l ) + 2 ( z N  +  / '  - { 1  +  a ) y  ± ' Jk _ 
^ lyN{a(\ + Y)+2y(\-fi)-2N{j + a)-ccy) 
where: 
K = -4yN{2a+Y - ay -2Ypi){a+2y + ay -2y/x-2cN-2-0- ccyN + 2/1") 
A = -(-ctY' •^2Y^ti—2dM-2"^-ay^N•ir2Y^(^-Y) 
The solution of the inequality 2a?*' >0 is: 
- c,+q,±Va'-4(-2(r-g)g+t<^)* 
2(D,+Z),) 
where: 
a = —2Hii(f -a)- 2a'6N {N -1)^ + +2^^0(1 -a)+2cd^^y/G-a^NV - y/V {\ — y^) + y/V 
b = -2m{\ -a)- 2a'HN- + 2HN\ir(} - a)+2afflV V " a'KNV + KiiA^(y - ly) 
c, = 2H{y/ -a)+2oiN0(1 -a)+ 2a^N'd - 2Ny/0+2aNy/6 
c,^-2oiN''\f/e^a-NV +\i/V-Ky/V 
D ,  s -2afflV(l - a ) -  2 a ^ H N ' '  +  2 H N y r i \  -  a)+2aHN''y/ - a^KNV, 
D^=KxffV{xif-\), e = a+(l-M)y 
K^(N-l)V-(y^-a) and H=NVaHN-i)V\l-M). 
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